The importance of EU as an external factor on democratic consolidation. The cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia by Hilleren, Ann Katrin
Charles University 
Faculty of Social Sciences
The Importance o f  the EU  as an External Factor on Democratic Consolidation:
The Cases o f  
The Czech Republic and Slovakia
Ann Katrin Hilleren 
May 2007
Charles University 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
International Economic and Political Studies
The Importance o f  the EU  as an External Factor on Democratic Consolidation:
The Cases o f  
The Czech Republic and Slovakia
Master Thesis 
May 2007
Author: Ann Katrin Hilleren
Supervisor: Petr Just
DECLARATION
This thesis is a presentation of my original research work. Wherever contributions of others 
are involved, every effort is made to indicate this clearly, with due reference to the literature, 
and acknowledgement of collaborative research and discussions.
Ann Katrin Hilleren 
[candidate’s name and signature]
Date:
Abstract:
Title: The importance o f the EU as an External Factor on Democratic Consolidation. 
The cases o f the Czech Republic and Slovakia
Supervisor: Petr Just
Outline:
The breakdown of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe has offered scholars in the 
field of transition and regime change theory, and comparative politics in general, a major 
opportunity to test out former theories, but also formulate new ones. Obviously, no theory is 
alone applicable to the complexity of the transitions. There is a variety of cases, each with 
distinct developments before, during and after the transition to democracy has been 
completed.
Some common features are still possible to extract when studying regime change in a region. 
As for Central and Eastern Europe, one of the most outstanding characteristics of the 
transition to democracy has been the visibility and importance of external factors. Previously 
the view was held that external factors were essentially secondary to domestic processes of 
regime change. The studies on Central and Eastern Europe carried out the last 15 years might 
show another picture, and that leads us to the core of this paper. How important have the 
external factors been? After providing the reader with some relevant theories on democracy 
and démocratisation, the focus is turned to the examination of external influences on 
transition in this region. In order to narrow down the complexity of the subject, the European 
Union has been chosen as the variable to examine closer, but without ignoring other factors of 
significance, as for example NATO membership. The incentives for membership in the EU 
have in general been strong, and in order to receive invitation for accession, the applicants in 
the post-communist countries had to fulfil conditions governing almost every aspect of their 
political, economic and social institutions. This again leads to the assumption that external 
factors are interwoven with domestic developments.
The cases chosen for this study are the neighbouring countries of Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. Although they had a common past in Czechoslovakia, their paths to transitions to 
democracy and EU accession parted. Slovakia demonstrated insufficient progress on domestic 
political reforms, and authoritarian leadership, which again had consequences on their 
progress in the application progress, while the Czech Republic had a more positive 
advancement. The cases have been chosen just because of their differences, and with the 
assumption that these distinctions might help proving whether or not the EU is one of the 
most important external factors in regime change and democratic consolidation.
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1.0 Introduction
To be born into a world which is already democratic increases the 
pressures on new democracies to consolidate quickly but provides 
a more supportive environment which will probably assist the final 
outcome. The first democracies o f modern times were not so much 
adopting a new political order as inventing it. (...) Post-communist 
democracies were delivered into a world where democratic ideas 
were already becoming predominant; as a result, they are expected 
to mimic established examples without the economic resources and 
gradual development which helped the countries o f the first wave1.
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe underwent major political 
and economic changes as their communist political system crumbled 
away after about half a century. The manners of why and how the 
transformations to democracies happened are not homogenous; still the 
processes share several common characteristics. New democracies are 
political construction sites, and the process of building can differ widely 
from country to country, even though the final goals are the same.
There are a number of factors influencing both transformation and 
consolidation. One hand there you have the functions of internal factors 
in the processes; on the other hand, the influences of external factors. 
The latter has been given a special emphasis in many studies carried out 
on post-communist political and economic transformations, as 
international organisations and institutions have played a larger role 
than what has previously been the case. The importance of external 
factors on democratic consolidation, and the assumption that they in 
fact have been rather crucial in many respects of improving the 
democratic quality, is the subject this paper is seeking to examine. In 
order to narrow down the subject of study, as well as due to its 
undeniable significance in the international society today, the focus is
1 Hague & Harrop (2001): 26
1
mainly on the role of the EU. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are 
chosen as cases to prove whether the working thesis hold ground or not. 
The two case studies described below are serving as good examples of 
countries with contrasting roads to democratic consolidation, even 
though they have a great deal of common characteristic as well.
The focus of this thesis will not be on the actual regime change, but 
rather the transition and consolidation process afterwards. The working 
thesis has been that the EU has played a specific role in the 
consolidation process, as the countries have strived for EU membership 
from the very beginning of their transformation process. The road to 
consolidated democracies has therefore been one natural and necessary 
to follow, as several basic democratic requirements must be in place 
before one can enter the European Union, as a part of EU’s so-called 
conditionality. Here, the cases of Czech Republic and Slovakia are 
chosen to illustrate how this process has taken place. Czech Republic 
serves as a good example of how this consolidation process has gone 
relatively smoothly, while Slovakia has had a winding road before they 
could step into the European family. Hence, the paper starts out with the 
introduction of democratic history and theories. The democratic roots in 
the ancient Greece will be briefly examined, before the road from direct 
to representative democracy is portrayed in the light of the evolution of 
a few democratic institutions. Then the focus turns to the theoretical 
part, which first gives the reader a brief look at Dahl’s advocacy of the 
democratic way of governing. Arendt Lijphart provides a useful 
framework for two types of democracies; the majoritarian model and 
the consensus model, which will come in hand in the later 
understanding of the political system of the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. Linz and Stepan are two well-known writers in the field of 
studying democratization, and their classifications are further 
supporting the later analysis. They divide a consolidated democracy in 
to five areas: the existence of a free and lively civil society, a political 
society, the rule of law, a usable bureaucracy, and an economic society. 
The political society will get most of the attention in the case studies.
2
Further, the process of democratization is seen in the light of 
Huntington’s three waves of democratization. He argues that the post­
communist wave should be included in his third wave, the choice here 
has however been to treat it as a separate phenomenon. The next 
chapter gets to the core of the subject, when external factors as a 
category are considered in the light of conditionality. Subsequently, the 
case of the European Union is further examined. The Czech Republic 
and Slovakia are both analyzed in terms of several factors; still the 
conditionality element is kept as a guiding dimension. Eventually, some 
remarks about the post-accession period are made, with some notes on 
the first election to the European Parliament, as well as some general 
remarks on the post-communist enlargement and the lessons that can be 
drawn from it.
2.0 History of and theories on democracy
2.1 The early beginning
In order to establish what a democracy is today, a natural starting point 
is the origin, the core point of democracy, which dates back to the 
ancient Athens in the fifth century BC. The term itself consists of two 
words, krato, which means rule, and demos, which means people. 
Hence, the true meaning was rule by the people. Athens was the leading 
city-state of ancient Greece between 461 and 322 BC, and here the first 
known example of a direct democracy could be found in the Ekklesia, 
which was the People’s Assembly. There, every citizen2 aged at least 20 
could attend assembly sessions, and take part in making decisions 
regarding everything from minor issues to important ones like those 
concerning war and peace. The famous philosopher Aristotle described 
the democracy of Athens in The Politics, where he has seven distinct 
characteristics: 1. All to rule over each other and each other in his turn 
over all. 2. Appointment to all offices, expect those requiring
2 I.e. the male population
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experience and skill, by lot. 3. No property qualification for office 
holding, or only a very low one. 4. Tenure of office should be brief and 
no man should hold the same office twice (expect military positions). 5. 
Juries selected from all citizens should judge all major causes. 6. The 
assembly should be supreme over all causes. 7. Those attending the 
assembly and serving as jurors and magistrates should be paid for their 
services.3 An executive council was responsible for the administrative 
functions, which through its system of rotation allowed for about one in 
three citizens to participate at one point in their life, really exemplifying 
the true spirit of direct democracy. Of course, the moderate size of the 
city-state, with approximately 40 000 people, made this possible. The 
final leg of the democracy of Athens was its legal system, which 
functioned as an arena of accountability, where the juries consisted of 
several hundred people randomly selected form the public. However, as 
Hague & Harrop point out, there were also serious flaws in this form of 
democracy. The vast majority of adults, including women, slaves and 
foreign residents, did not have the right to participate in the assembly. 
Further, a majority of those who did have the right to attend to the 
sessions were mostly absent. In addition, the system itself was 
elaborate, time-consuming and expensive, and a too complex way of 
governing such a small society. In our modem, market-oriented world, 
such time consumption could obviously never work. The last point is 
that the lack of bureaucracy contributed to a period of ineffective 
government, which in turn led to the end of the Athenian republic after 
it was defeated in war.4 Still, as S. Finer concluded: The Greeks 
invented two o f the most potent political features o f our present age: 
they invented the very idea o f a citizen -  as opposed to subject -  and 
they invented democracy.5
The next time the democratic ideals began to reappear, was around 
1100 C.E. in many of Italy’s northern cities. Participation in the




governing bodies was at first restricted to upper-class families, but as 
time went by, people in the lower strata’s of society began to demand 
the right to participate as well. They were what we today call middle- 
class, i.e. the newly rich, the smaller merchants and bankers, the skilled 
and organized artisans, and the foot soldiers. They had the ability to 
organize themselves, in addition to outnumbering the upper class. 
However, after about 200 years, the governments of some of the major 
cities eroded because of economic decline, corruption, oligarchy, war, 
and seizure of power of authoritarian rulers. This was also the end of 
the city-states, as they became subordinate units of the national state or 
country.6
2.2 From direct to representative democracy
Still, these early examples of democratic rule lacked several of the 
characteristics of modem representative government. There was no 
national parliament consisting of elected representatives, nor any 
popularly chosen local governments subordinate to the national 
government. In other words, a system where democracy on the local 
level was combined with the top level was not yet invented. Today, 
citizenship is encompassing the vast majority of the adult population. 
Further, the governments in the early days used to be mainly self- 
governed, while today the governments are elected, and the elections 
are a central feature of a modem representative democracy. In addition, 
our democracies are based on a liberal philosophy, which means that 
the role of the state is restricted by the constitution. Such a distinction 
between public and private would be unheard of in the ancient Greece.7
In the nineteenth century, stimulated not just by the American and
French revolutions but also by the diffusion of power brought about by
mass literacy and industrialization, the notion of turning ancient
6 Dahl (1998): 15
7 Hague&Harrop (2001): 19
5
institutions into representative bodies elected from a wide franchise 
rapidly gained ground.H
The seeds of the modem representative democracy were sowed already 
in the eighteenth century, as certain political ideas and practices were 
introduced during the Enlightenment. Several great thinkers had put 
forth their ideas on individual rights and liberties. It was the century of 
the fathers of political theory such as Locke, Voltaire, Montesquieu, 
and Rousseau, who were criticizing the absolutistic state and advocating 
alternative reason-based forms of rule. The climax of the century was 
the reforms in England, and the Revolution in America in 1776 and 
France in 1789. The two Revolutions transformed politics within the 
states, as sovereignty was removed from the monarch and instead fixed 
in institutions claiming to represent the people.9 Due to the logic of 
equality, local assemblies had been created in Scandinavia, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Britain, where free men, to a certain 
extent at least, could participate in governing. This was based on the 
notion that governments needed the consent of those they were 
governing. It was initially a claim about raising taxes, but grew into 
being applied to laws in general. Where the area was too large for direct 
attendance, representation was introduced. It was not secured by lot or 
random selection, but by elections. These European political ideas and 
practices provided a base from which democratization could proceed 
(...) but i f  the ideas, traditions, history, and practices just described 
held a promise o f democratization, it was, at best, only a promise.10
Hindering democratization were firstly the gross inequalities. There 
were differences between the rights, duties, influence and power of the 
slaves and the free men, of rich and poor, master and servant, men and 
women, feudal lords and tenants, monarchs and their subjects, just to 
mention a few. Subsequently, assemblies and parliaments were far from
8 Ibid.
9 Knutsen (1997): 146
10 Dahl (1998): 23
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meeting minimal democratic standards, the latter being full of privileges 
for the aristocracy and higher clergy. Representatives from the lower 
layers of the population did only have a partial saying in lawmaking, 
and the monarchs were superior and in control. Third, the whole people 
were not represented. About half the population was not taking part in 
the decision-making. The time of the expansion of the suffrage was still 
a century away. Another fault was the problem of including people in 
the democratic ideas and beliefs, as most of them had no clear 
perception of what a democracy was. Freedom of expression in speech 
and press was also strongly limited, and political opposition was neither 
legitimate nor legal.11
As for the problem of reinventing democracy for large states, 
representative democracy proved to be an excellent solution; it included 
a government capable of embracing and confederating the various 
interests of the population, and it combines the popular preferences with 
“expert” judgements. The population is too large for a direct democracy 
to work, moreover are their preferences too altering, and there are too 
many issues on the political agenda. A representative democracy is then 
limited to the question of who governs. This theory of democracy 
gained ground as the first wave of democracies emerged in the 
nineteenth century, which will be further discussed under. The 
economist Joseph Schumpeter conceived democracy to be in party 
competition. He argued that elections should not be constructed as a 
device through which voters elect representatives to carry out their 
will; rather, the role o f elections is simply to produce a government. 12 
It is then just a matter of deciding who shall decide, and the elector is 
merely a political accessory. As for the liberal character of democracy, 
its core is limited government. The aim to shelter individual freedom 
and it is protective in terms of defending both the population and its 
minorities, respectively from its rulers and from a tyrannical majority. 
Hence, the original principle of self-rule is abandoned, instead the form
11 Ibid. 24
12 Hague & Harrop (2001): 20
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of rule consists of governments who are responsible for the decision­
making, and its main tasks are the protection of the rights of the citizens 
and property-owners, in a flexible and scalable political system.13
The nineteenth century saw the rise of ideological politics and mass 
participation, and a new confidence in reason and science was 
emerging. The following century transformed such ideas into systems 
of thought - the spread of “isms”. One o f the most important novelties o f  
this busy age (...) was not so much the discussion o f the ides 
themselves; rather it was their synthesizing into systems o f ideas and 
the self-conscious placement o f these systems in a social context.14 
Social thought was under evolution, and three schools of authors 
emerged. First, there were the liberal authors, drawing on the theories of 
thinkers such as Adam Smith. The second branch was conservative, 
with theorists like Burke, Malthus, and Bismarck. The third group 
contained radical theorists, like Marx and Engels. Around the turn of 
the century, the discussions on social though resulted in three major 
secular systems of political thought in the West: the three ideologies15 
of liberalism, radicalism, and conservatism.16
2.3 Patterns of democracy
After a brief overview of the historical evolution of democratic 
principles, a theoretical part is useful to grasp the complexity of the 
subject. First, it is time to introduce Robert Dahl’s definition of why 
democracy is the preferable system of governing a state. Until the 
twentieth century, the superiority of nondemocratic systems was the 
norm in both theory and practice. As referred to above, democratic 
ideas were introduced earlier; still, democracy as we know it today 
came to be mainly in the twentieth century. In his classic On
13 Ibid.
14 Knutsen (1997): 145
15 An ideology is a systematic body o f beliefs about the structures and processes of 
society; it includes a comprehensive theory o f human nature that sustains a 
programme o f practical politics (Knutsen: 150)
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Democracy, Dahl describes ten advantages of democratic rule. The first 
advantage claims that democracy helps to prevent government by 
tyranny. To avoid autocratic rule can be described as one of the most 
fundamental and persistent problems in politics. Secondly, democracy 
guarantees a number of essential rights that are normally not included in 
nondemocratic systems, like the right to participate and vote. The third 
advantage is the general provision of freedom, such the freedom of 
expression. Fourth, democracy helps the people to protect their own 
fundamental interests. The argument is explained by referring to John 
Stuart Mill, who said that you are only able to protect your rights and 
interests from abuse by government only if you are participating in 
determining the conduct of the government. The fifth element of 
democracy advocacy is the notion of moral autonomy. Living in 
association with others means that it is necessary to live under laws, but 
these are laws that the individual has freely agreed to live under. Sixth, 
only a democratic government can provide a maximum opportunity for 
exercising moral responsibility, as you are subject to collective 
decisions. Number seven stresses the democracy’s influence on human 
development. The eight advocating point is political equality, as 
democracy is the only alternative of government which can foster this. 
Empirical evidence show that democracies in the modem sense do not 
fight wars with another democracy, says the ninth claim. Finally, 
countries with democratic governments tend to be more prosperous than 
countries with nondemocratic governments.17
In his Patterns o f Democracy, Arendt Lijphart gives a far-reaching 
framework of how a democracy can be organized and run. This includes 
a variety of formal governmental institutions, like legislatures and 
courts, as well as political party and interest group systems. He 
examines the institutions from the perspective of how majoritarian or 
consensual their rules and practises are.
16 Ibid. 148-50
17 Dahl (1998): 4 5 - 6 0
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Defining democracy as “government by and for the people ’’ raises 
a fundamental question: who will do the governing and to whose 
interests should the government be responsive when the people are 
in disagreement and have divergent preferences? One answer to 
this dilemma is: the majority o f the people. This is the essence o f  
the majoritarian model o f democracy. (...) The alternative answer 
to the dilemma is: as many as possible. This is the crux o f the 
consensus model18.
The latter model is aimed at sharing, dispersing, and limiting power in a 
majority of ways and is characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining, and 
compromise, while the former concentrates power in the hands of a bare 
majority and is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial. Ten differences 
of the two models are lined out in two dimensions. The first one is 
called the executives-parties dimension and entails the following five 
differences: Concentration of executive power in single-party majority 
cabinets versus executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions; 
executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant 
versus executive-legislative balance of power; two-party versus 
multiparty systems; majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems 
versus proportional representation; and pluralist interest group systems 
with free-for-all competition among groups versus coordinated and 
corporatist interest group systems aimed at compromise and 
concentration. The second is called the federal-unitary dimension and 
bare five further characteristics: Unitary and centralized government 
versus federal and decentralized government; concentration of 
legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus division of 
legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted 
houses; flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities 
versus rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary 
majorities; systems in which legislatures have the final word on the 
constitutionality of their own legislation versus systems in which laws
18 Lijphart (1999): 1-2
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are subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or 
constitutional courts; central banks that are dependent on the executive 
versus independent central banks.19
The majoritarian model is also known as the Westminster model, as it 
originates in the United Kingdom. The characteristics of the British 
Westminster model can serve as one of the better examples of the 
majoritarian type of rule. In the executive-parties dimension, the first 
characteristic of the British model is the concentration of executive 
power in one-party and bare-majority cabinets, and the cabinet is the 
most powerful organ of the British government. The second feature is 
cabinet dominance, as the system of government is parliamentary; the 
cabinet is dependent on the confidence of Parliament. However, the 
cabinet is composed of the leaders of the majority party in the House of 
Commons, and consequently counting on their support and is in reality 
dominant towards them. Third, two large parties dominate the British 
politics: the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, which are mainly 
diverging form each other on socioeconomic issues. The fourth 
characteristic is the majoritarian and disproportional system of election. 
The members to the House of Commons are elected in single-member 
districts according to the plurality method, the so-called “first past the 
post” system. Fifth, the system favours interest group pluralism, which 
means a multiplicity of interest groups that exert pressure on the 
government in an uncoordinated and competitive manner. Along the 
federal-unitary dimension, five further elements can be identified. First, 
the government is unitary and centralized. The local governments do 
not enjoy any constitutionally guaranteed powers, and they are 
financially dependent on the central government.20 Next, there is a 
concentration of power in a unicameral legislature. The majoritarian 
principle says that the legislative power should be concentrated in a 
single house or chamber, and here the British system deviates from the
19 Ibid. 2-4
20 Two execptions: the autonomy o f the parliament in Northern Ireland, as well as 
Scotland and Wales.
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norm, as they have the House of Commons and the House of Lords, 
still, the sole power of the latter is to delay the bills. The third 
characteristic is the constitutional flexibility; in the British case, the 
constitution is unwritten in the sense that there is no single document 
describing the composition and powers of the governmental institutions 
and the rights of the citizens. In stead, theses are defined in a number of 
basic laws like the Magna Carta of 1215 and the Bill of Rights of 1689. 
The consequence of such flexibility is that the constitution can be 
changed by Parliament like any other law. The fourth factor of this 
dimension is the absence of judicial review, which is closely connected 
to the unwritten constitution; as there is no single document with the 
status of higher law, the courts cannot test the constitutionality of 
regular legislation. The final element of the Westminster model is a 
central bank controlled by the executive. The Bank of England was 
given its operational independence first in 1997, which was one of the 
first tasks Blair’s Labour government performed.21
The consensus model of democracy will be described according to the 
above-introduced, elements, which are completely opposite, as the goal 
of this model is to share, disperse, and restrain power. Lijphart has 
chosen Switzerland as one of the best cases for studying the model in 
practice. The first characteristic is the executive power-sharing in broad 
coalition cabinets, in order to let the most of the important parties share 
the executive power. In Switzerland, four parties share the seven 
executive positions of the Federal Council proportionally according to a 
2:2:2:1 formula. Another criterion is that the linguistic groups are 
represented in rough proportion to their sizes. Second, there is a balance 
of power between the executive and the legislative. The Swiss example 
is not presidential nor parliamentary; the Federal Council is elected 
individually for a fixed term of four years, and is stated in the 
Constitution that the legislature cannot stage a vote of no confidence 
during the period. It is a formal separation of the power making both
21 Ibid. 10-21
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bodies highly independent. Thirdly, the Swiss have a multiparty system, 
allowing more people to come to power. Still, as mentioned above, only 
four parties reach the Federal Council. Fourth, the electoral system is 
proportional, which means that it aims at dividing the parliamentary 
seats among the parties in proportion to the votes they receive. Interest 
group corporatism is the fifth element. Three general characteristics of 
the corporative system can be identified: tripartite concentration, 
relatively few and large interest groups, and the prominence of peak 
associations. The first characteristic of the second dimension is a 
federal and decentralized government; Switzerland is in fact one of the 
most decentralized countries in the world. The power is divided 
between the central government and the governments of twenty cantons 
and six so-called half-cantons. Second, the bicameral structure of the 
legislature is strong, and justified by the need to give special 
representation to minorities, including the smaller states in the federal 
systems. This requires two conditions: the upper house must be elected 
on a different basis than the lower house, and it must have real power. 
Third, constitutional rigidity is an important characteristic. Switzerland 
has a written constitution, which, in order to be changed, requires a 
special majority in parliament. Amendments even require the approval 
in a referendum. As for the fourth factor of judicial review, Switzerland 
deviates from the pure consensus model, as its supreme court, the 
Federal Tribunal, does not have the right of judicial review. The final 
characteristic is independence of the central bank, which Switzerland 
has, in fact, the bank has been regarded as one of the most independent 
and strong central banks.22
2.4 Transition to democracy
A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has 
been reached about political procedures to produce an elected 
government, when a government comes to power that is the direct 
result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has
22 Ibid. 34-41
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the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, 
legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does 
not have to share power with other bodies the jure.23
According to Linz and Stepan, another notion important to take notice 
of is that it is important to distinguish between liberalization and 
democratization, as the former can entail a mix of policy and social 
changes. Examples of such are less censorship of the media, a degree of 
greater space for the organization of autonomous working-class 
activities, legal safeguards for individuals such as habeas corpus, 
releasing political prisoners, returning exiles, improving the distribution 
of income, and most importantly, the toleration of opposition. The latter 
term is a wider and more specifically political concept. The right to win 
control of the government through open contestation is a requirement, 
which in turn requires free competitive election, and then again 
determines who governs. Two further issues can be said about their 
definition of democratic transitions. First, the beginning of a transition 
does not mean that it will be completed, even though a new 
authoritarian regime does not assume power. Examples of when this 
can happen is where a previously ruling military retains extensive 
prerogatives that the democratically elected government is not even in 
principle sovereign, even though the military claims to have given up 
direct control of government. Second, the need to reach an agreement 
on the specific institutional arrangement for producing democratic 
government means they are alerted towards decision-making within the 
democratic political area. Institutional disagreements over issues like 
unitary versus a federal state, a monarchical or republican form of 
government, or the type of electoral system might raise questions about 
the legitimacy. Institutional indeterminacy about core procedures 
necessary for producing democracy are endangering the transition in 
two ways, as it may leave it incomplete, as well as postponing any 
consolidation at all. This point implies a deep and continuous
23 Linz & Stepan (1996): 3
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confrontation and ambivalence about democratic institutions among the 
political elite and the majority of the population.24
2.5 When democracy becomes the only game in town
Even though the transition to democracy is completed, a consolidated 
democracy is not automatically in place, as certain tasks still needs to 
be accomplished, in addition to the cultivation of attitudes and habits. 
Linz and Stepan sums up the main points of consolidation in one point, 
namely that democracy has become the only game in town25. This 
includes three dimensions, behavioural, attitudinal, and consolidation. 
Regarding the first dimension, this implies that no significant political 
groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede 
from the state. The elected government emerging from the transition 
should no longer have to worry about avoiding democratic breakdown. 
As for the attitudinal dimension, this entails the overwhelming majority 
of the people to believe that any further political change must emerge 
from within the parameters of democratic recipes. The constitutional 
dimension involves the condition that all the actors in the polity become 
accustomed to the fact that political conflict will be resolved according 
to political norms, and that violations of these are liable to be both 
ineffective and costly. In short, with consolidation, democracy becomes 
routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even 
psychological life, as well as in calculations for achieving success. 26
The definition of a consolidated democracy according to the three 
dimensions can then be elaborated. In behavioural terms, consolidation 
is present when there are no significant national, social, economic, 
political, or institutional actors who are spending significant resources 
on attempting to achieve their objective by creating a nondemocratic 





state. According to attitudinal terms, the consolidation is in place when 
the belief that democratic procedures and institution are the most 
appropriate way to govern collective life in a society is held by a 
majority of the public opinion. Last, the constitutional factor means 
consolidation when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike 
become subjected and habituated to the resolution of conflict within the 
specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new 
democratic process. Still, a consolidated democracy does not rule out 
that it could break down at one point. However, this is then believed to 
be due to a new dynamic, implying a nondemocratic alternative that 
gains significant supporters and former loyalist that starts to behave in 
disloyal matters.
2.6 Five arenas of a consolidated democracy
Linz and Stepan see the need of the presence of five interacting arenas 
in order for the consolidation to exist. The underlying assumption is that 
a state already exists, as a large group of individuals who lack 
identification with the state and want to join another one or create new 
one raise fundamental and often unsolvable problems, and there cannot 
be a consolidated modem democratic regime. The first condition is the 
existence of a free and lively civil society, which is the arena where 
relative autonomous and self-organized groups, movements and 
individuals are tempting to articulate values, create associations and 
solidarities, and advance their interests. The civil society spans from 
religious groupings, neighbourhood groupings to trade unions. The idea 
o f civil society (...) had great capacity to mobilize the opposition 
(...)and was crucial in Eastern Europe as a vehicle for asserting the 
autonomy o f those who wanted to act ‘‘as i f  they were free ”, especially
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in Poland. In addition to the organized, there are all the ordinary 
citizens who are not part of any organization, but they are still often 




demonstrations, express disapproval of the police and the authorities 
and their opposition to specific measures, and in the end, they challenge 
the regime.
The second arena is the political society, which means the arena where 
polity rearranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control 
over public power and the state apparatus. It is necessary factor, as it 
involves the development of the core institutions of a democratic 
political society like parties, elections, political leadership, and 
legislatures. A society constitutes itself politically to make these choices 
and elect and monitor democratic government. The civil and political 
society are also complementary, as the political society, informed, 
pressured, and periodically renewed by civil society, must somehow 
achieve a workable agreement on the myriad ways in which democratic 
power will be crafted and exercised.29 There must be both 
intermediation and compromise.
The rule of law constitutes the third arena. It must be respected by all 
the significant actors in a democratic society, and an obligatory 
condition is that the rule of law is embodied in a spirit of 
constitutionalism, which means that it is not only rule by 
majoritarianism. There must also be a consensus, a relatively strong 
one, over the constitution and a commitment to procedures of 
governance that are self-binding, additionally a clear hierarchy o f laws, 
interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported by a 
strong legal culture in civil society. 30
Further requirements for democratic consolidation can be found in 
whether or not the democracy has a usable bureaucracy. A government 
needs to exercise effectively its claim to what characterises very 
existence of a state: the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the 




to make regulations and extractions. Important questions about the 
usability o f the state bureaucracy by new democrats inevitably emerge 
in cases (as in much o f post-Communist Europe) where the distinction 
between the party and the state had been virtually obliterated and the 
party went out o f power, disintegrated, or was de-legitimized.31
Finally, a consolidated democracy needs the arena Linz and Stepan 
label the economic society. They back this up by making two claims. 
The first one consists of the fact that there has never been, or can be, a 
consolidated democracy in a command economy in a time of non-war. 
The second claim is that if there is a pure market economy, there cannot 
be a modem consolidated democracy. Hence, a set of socio-politically 
crafted and accepted norms, institutions, and regulations that mediate 
between state and market is required. They have identified three reasons 
for why this is the case. First, in order to exist, markets require 
corporation laws, the regulation of stock markets, regulated standards 
for weight, measurement, and the protection of public and private 
property. Second, if the market is not functioning well, the state needs 
to correct the market failures. Third, the citizens demand certain public 
goods in the areas of education, health, transportation, a safety net for 
people hurt by major market swings, a degree of alleviation of gross 
inequality. A democracy entails free public contestation concerning 
such governmental priorities.32
To summarize, the five arenas listed above are highly inter-relating, and 
dependent upon each other, as no arena can function well without the 
others. An example: civil society in a democracy needs the support o a 
rule o f law that guarantees the right o f association and needs the 
support o f a sate apparatus that will effectively impose legal sanctions 
on those who would attempt to use illegal means to stop groups from  





3.0 Democratization in theory and practice
3.1 Huntington’s three waves of democratization
A wave o f democratization is a group o f transitions from  
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specific 
period and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite 
direction during that period (...).34 Huntington has identified three 
waves of democratization. The first one spans over almost a century, 
from the 1820s to 1926. The main achievement in this period was the 
widening of the suffrage, resulting in the inclusion of a large part of the 
male population, in some countries for the women as well. About 29 
democracies were brought into being in the first wave. The USA is 
regarded to be one of the “ideal” examples of the first wave of 
democratization, together with Great Britain.
Even today, we must regard the USA as the clearest example of a liberal 
democracy in which limited government is entrenched by design. The 
founding fathers wanted, above all, to prevent tyranny, including tyranny 
by the majority. James Madison wrote that “the accumulation of powers 
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial in the same hands...may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny ”. To prevent any government -  
and especially elected ones - from acquiring too much power, the 
constitution set up an elaborate system of checks and balances between 
the institutions of government.35
However, by 1942 the number was reduced to 12, in what Huntington 
characterises as the first reverse wave, marked by a number of fascist 
regimes like in Italy and Germany. The second wave came about with 
the triumph of the Allies in the World War II, and reached its peak in 
1962. Now, 36 countries were governed democratically. Established 
democracies emerged from the ruins of defeated dictatorships in West 
Germany, Austria, Japan, and Italy, in addition to the new state of India
34 Huntington (1991): 15
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and in the former British dominion of India. Many of these democracies 
were established with firm domestic roots, and were helped by 
American economic aid. Characteristic of this wave was also the 
domination of single parties in some countries, such as Congress in 
India, the Christian Democrats in Italy, the LDP in Japan, and Labour in 
Israel .36The second wave was also to be followed by a reverse wave; 
from 1960 to 1975, six countries lost their democratic status. The 
emergence of the third wave of democracies came around 1974, and 
included highly diverse elements such as the end of dictatorship in 
Greece, Portugal and Spain in Southern Europe. The wave also included 
the retreats of the generals in much of Latin America in the 1980s, and 
the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and East Europe at the
' i n
end of the 1980s. The transitions bear five main characteristics. First, 
there was an inability to maintain the legitimacy due to economic 
and/or military failure in the authoritarian regimes. Second, there was a 
major economic growth in the 1960s, which raised the living standard 
and expanded the middle class. Third, the national catholic churches 
became unconcealed opponents of authoritarianism, and thereby 
making a large impact on the catholic population’s political 
orientations. The fourth factor is how the changes in the policies of the 
external actors, like the EU38, the USA and the Soviet Union. The last 
characteristic is the “snowballing” effect, meaning that the 
transformations earlier in the wave were stimulating and providing 
models for the latter ones. The third wave started out in Catholic 
countries like Portugal and Spain, then on to several South and Central 
America, and then back to Europe, this time to the continent’s central 
and eastern parts.39
35 Hague & Harrop (2001): 21
36 Ibid. 23
37 Ibid.
38 At the time, the European Community
39 Huntington (1991): 16
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3.2 The post-communist wave of democratization
The above-described classifications are serving well in explaining 
democratic transitions in the past. Still, there are disputes on whether 
the post-communist transitions belong in the third wave, as one can 
argue that the post-communist wave bears several distinctions from the 
former transitions and therefore needs to be treated as a separate 
phenomenon. The latter is the approach chosen in this context. 
Democratic consolidations are in most cases a result of international 
pull and domestic push. Still, the degree of importance in either case 
varies. Sometimes there is an immense domestic demand for change, 
while in other circumstances the international factors play a major role 
on the transition outcome. As for the CEE-countries, not many disputes 
can be identified about the fact that the international environment has 
played a significant role. The post-communist wave in these countries 
has three distinct aspects from the former waves, namely the salience of 
the international environment; the outward orientation of elites and 
peoples; and the simultaneity of democratization and market reforms.40
The collapse of the Soviet Union with both its inner and outer empires 
did initialize the transition from authoritarian rule, and is hence one of 
the major international factors. Only the post-war wave can be said to 
have the same extensive importance of the international involvement 
factor. The push towards the West holds several elements. There was a 
wish for a flight from the subordination of the Soviet system with its 
undermining of national sovereignty. In addition, the elites of the CEE- 
countries wanted to identify themselves with what they perceived as the 
heartland of European civilization. Adding up to the last-mentioned 
element, is the identification of a historical conditioned tendency in 
several of the countries to look beyond their borders for solutions. They 
have a centuries’ long history of subordination to imperial rule, and this 
has exposed them to external penetration. The elites have consequently
40 Zielonka & Pravda (2001): 2
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been fostered to be concerned with external factors, and this can still be 
shown in their commitment to tie their economic and political 
development with outside involvement. The last characteristic, the 
simultaneity of democratization and market reforms, have a number of 
implications. On one hand, you have the external actors, promoting the 
market as a decisive factor for both strengthening the democratization 
and securing the ties with the West. On the other hand, you have the 
domestic leaders, who are concerned with building power and are 
politicizing the economic reforms. The citizens can experience both 
processes as difficult to handle, as they make large alternations in their 
daily lives, and popular criticism is likely to occur.41
4.0 External factors on democratization
4.1 Introducing the category
The category labelled external factors encompasses a wide range of 
actors and manners of behaviour. It can include transnational 
phenomena, regionalism, non-governmental organisations, states, and 
international institutions. Here, the international organisations, which 
include the EU, NATO, OSCE, and IMF, will hold the centre of 
attention. They have in common a loose set of stated objectives, and 
these include helping the promotion of democracy and the market, as 
well as creating or ensuring stability and security. Evidently, they vary 
in regards to what extent they are focusing on the different objectives, 
and are consequently subjects to stark criticism. Nonetheless, no matter 
what their underlying interests might or might not be, they claim a 
commitment to democratic promotion in the post-communist Central 
and Eastern Europe; they make efforts to advance the spread a 
consolidation of liberal democracy in the ashes of communism. In the 
support given to the democratization in southern Europe in the 1970’s, 
the security concern was of major importance, as the prevention of the
41 Ibid. 2-3
22
further spread of communism. Today, the security concerns are tied 
together with the prevention of instability, as democratic values are 
seen as the best guarantee of long-term stability and peace both within 
and between the states. Further, the promotion of free market capitalism 
reflects a combination of idealism and pragmatism. The creation of free 
markets are seen as a necessity of democratization, furthermore, the 
creation of new markets gives economic gains for both the country and 
the ones interested in investing there. Another aspect is that it is easier 
to export and implement market capitalism than the political side of the 
project.42 There is more confidence that the capitalist model can travel 
across borders; after all, globalization is more advanced in economics 
than in politics. International organisations think they have more 
effective levers in the economic realm than in the political43 Still, 
although the international organisations might share some common 
objectives in their approach to the CEE-countries, they do not have any 
form of cooperation or coordination towards them. This has again led to 
efforts being conducted parallel and sometimes overlapping. As a 
result, the whole exercise o f democracy promotion often amounts to less 
than the sum o f its parts.44
Numerous instruments have been used to strengthen democratic 
consolidation, most of them being top-down measures such as political 
conditionality. The countries were supposed to meet certain political 
conditions in order to benefit from loans, aid, trade concessions, and 
membership in key regional organizations. Political conditionality 
entails the linking, by a state or international organization, o f  perceived 
benefits to another state to the fulfilment o f conditions relating to the 







Both the IMF and the World Bank distribute funds based on democratic 
criteria and conditionality, however the basis for when and why a 
country is given support has been proven inconsistent. Their main 
reasoning is that if a government shows commitment to democratic and 
marketing reforms, even if this does not add up to democratic standards, 
it is better to give support than to withdraw it and risking passing on 
power to less pro-Western and pro-market forces. This, together with 
the notion that economic incentives will strengthen the development 
towards democracy, is a reflection of American thinking. The latter is 
also evident in NATO, which has the potential of fostering democratic 
consolidation.46
For the CEE-countries, NATO was a key to Western membership and 
power, as well as security. Hence, NATO has had the opportunity to set 
certain demands or requirements for joining the organisation. Still, 
NATO has also had a history of supporting authoritarian regimes when 
it served their security interests. This was evident during the cold war, 
when its main strategic goal was to counter the Soviet Union. It 
accepted the authoritarian Salazar regime in Portugal and the military 
regimes in Greece and Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s 47 As for the 
importance of the external factors on democratic consolidation, the 
European Union has, as will be elaborated further under, played the 
most decisive role48. If we return to Huntington and his third wave of 
democratization, he argues that the European Community back in the 
1970s was decisive in establishing democracy in countries like Greece, 
Spain, and Portugal. (...) the establishment o f democracy was seen as 
necessary to secure the economic benefits o f EC membership, while 
Community membership was in turn seen as a guarantee o f the stability 
o f democracy.49
46 Ibid. 11
47 Cottey & Forster: 31
48 Zielonka & Pravda (2001): 11-12
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4.2. Western pressure and promotion for democracy in CEE
As referred to above, the institutions of the Western world wanted 
democracy to be spread in Central and Eastern Europe, but were not 
coordinated on how to perform this task. Hence, the assistance from the 
West has fluctuated from country to country. Still, over the past decade, 
the international context has been far more present in the 
democratization process than what has been the case in earlier 
transitions, and three main reasons for this can be identified. Firstly, 
international organisations have become more interventionist while 
engaging in democracy promotion or building. Secondly, the 
international order has itself been restructured with predicable 
consequences for domestic politics. Thirdly, the extent of 
transformations in post-communist Europe is so much greater than in 
previous regime change and this has engaged international attention and 
efforts more than ever before. A precondition for the international 
involvement has of course been the very nature of the environment, as 
mechanisms for multilateral cooperation were well established at the 
beginning of the transitions. The political weight of European 
organisations, above all the EU, and transnational networks are more 
developed than ever before, as are their capacities and influence for 
democracy building.
4.3 Conditionality and transformative impact
4.3.1 INGOs and MNCs
Alexander Cooley has examined the Western integration thesis against 
the transition-era record of five types of external actors. First, he 
examines how INGOs50 and MNCs51 have affected the transition. Even 
though their activities have drawn much public attention, they have 
affected the overall course of the post-Communist transition to a low
49 Huntington (1991): 207
50 International nongovernmental organizations
51 Multinational companies
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extent. INGOs do not impose conditions on their projects recipients; 
hence, they lack means through which they can enforce change. 
Therefore, the countries need to be very receptive and willing to 
change. Still, this does not say that that they have been unimportant.
The INGOs have inserted themselves throughout almost every aspect of 
post-Communist life, with the promotion of democracy, advising on 
economic reforms, assessing in the drafting of legal and judicial 
reforms, or campaigning for the rights of women and minorities. Their 
most successful efforts can be found in Central Europe and the Baltics, 
since these societies have a tradition of an independent civil society. As 
for the effect on the political society, they have assisted in creating 
electoral systems, constitutions, and representative political parties. 
Others were involved with reforming civil service reforms, the 
reorganization of state bureaucracies and in helping to maintain public 
services, while others again were working with rule of law initiatives 
and the promotion of independent judiciaries. The economic society 
received assistance through the drafting of new legal codes and the 
enacting of institutional reforms that were necessary for the emerging 
market economies. Such efforts were tax codes, the creation of capital 
markets, managing rate regimes, developing independent central banks,
n
etc. The picture is however not so black and white when looking at the 
countries with less successful transitions. However, they are not in 
focus in this context, where Central Europe holds the centre of 
attention.
As for the MNCs and FDI53, the Central European and Baltic countries 
had mainly positive experiences. A basic economic theorem holds that 
FDI inflows will promote the private sector and strengthen the 
accompanying legal framework that guarantees private transactions. 
Next, guarantees of private property should promote political 
liberalization and individual freedom. The advantage of the CEE- 
countries are several, such as a skilled and relative cheap workforce,
52 Cooley: 27
53 Foreign direct investment
26
geographical proximity to Western Europe, and a favourable legal and 
institutional climate. These factors have made it possible to develop a 
wide range of economic markets. Again, by looking behind the 
shoulders of Central Europe and the Baltics, the picture is not so 
positive.54
4.3.2 The International financial institutions
The IFIs55 have had a greater impact on the overall transformation, or a 
moderate conditionality and mixed transformative impact as Cooley 
describes it. The IMF56 has been the most visible of the actors, as it 
created the Systemic Transformation Facility for the post-Communist 
countries, and established missions in all the countries. Loans were 
extended to all the countries expect Turkmenistan. Reasons for their 
greater impact on the transformation can be found in their demands, or 
in better wording, conditions. If a country wants a short-term loan, it 
needs to implement a set of economic reforms aimed at promoting 
market-oriented policies, and restrict the domestic aggregate demand. 
The countries have had individual agreements, but the main efforts are 
the same, namely to combat inflation, achieve macroeconomic stability, 
eliminate state subsidies and free price control, privatize state-owned 
enterprises, and liberalize the trade and exchange regimes. 57 In order 
to make the countries follow the rules, they have refused to release 
subsequent loan instalments to the ones lagging behind in the 
implementation, and by setting ceilings for external debts and 
borrowing and thereby regulated the access to the private capital 
markets. The critics against the IMF say that there has been too much 
focus on measures like lowering the inflation and spreading 
privatization, when the attention should rather be placed on the 
institutional and legal dimensions of market reforms. Further, the 
objections say that the reforms have been too comprehensive and rapid.
54 Ibid. 28 - 29
55 International financial institutions
56 International Monetary Fund
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They have consequently contracted economies adversely and resulted in 
unnecessary losses of economic output, employment, and social 
services.58
The role of the World Bank has been less significant than the IMF’s. 
Still, it has funded a great number of projects in the region. One of the 
main aims has been to strengthen or reconstruct the infrastructures or 
domestic institutional capacities of the states. Another target has been 
energy reform, and seeking to develop new sources of power within the 
market environments. There have also been broad initiatives in 
reforming health care, education, the civil service, and the social 
services, and land and agriculture reform. The latter approach has been 
successful in Central Europe and the Baltics, where private property in 
the agriculture sector has been institutionalized. The UN Development 
Program and the EBRD59 have focused on large-scale infrastructure 
projects, in addition to reforming state monopolies like energy, utilities, 
and telecommunications. The results have varied; sometimes they have 
been successful, while on other occasions the projects have been 
hindered by rent-seeking behaviour and corruption among state 
officials. In general, the problems with the IFIs have been the presence 
of too many of them within a country or even within an area of focus. 
Moreover, the transition process has been further complicated by rivalry 
between the IFIs and economic policy INGOs. All of them have 
different approaches to technical criteria and reforms, which has led to 
disputes, misunderstandings, and competition when they have been 
involved in the same sector. Over and above that, this lack of 
cooperation has been harmful for the sector itself.60
57 Ibid. 30
58 Ibid. 30-31
59 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
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4.3.3 The European Union and the NATO
The role of the European Union will be examined more in-depth later in 
this paper; still some generalisation about its significance can be 
introduced here. Together with NATO, the EU has by far been the most 
influential on the transition process in post-Communist Europe. These 
institutions have exercised strict demands, and hence Cooley has 
labelled them as external actors with high conditionality and a major 
transformative impact. In order even to receive invitations for  
accession, the post-Communist applicants have to fulfil detailed 
conditions governing almost every aspect o f their political, economic, 
and social institutions. The record now indicates that these conditions 
have promoted significant change within applicant states and legal 
harmonization with their Western counterparts.61
Observing the economic society, the detailed and extensive conditions 
for the reformation of the market gave the applicants no choice but to 
enact the changes designed to smooth the integration of candidate 
countries into the EU. Examples of the measures are capping public 
debt at 5% of the GDP, liberalizing prices, reforming regulations, 
allowing foreign ownership of privatized assets, etc. There was 
furthermore a positive spillover effect on the social polices in many 
cases. As for the critics, they have mainly been centred on worries 
about eroding the state sovereignty with the standardization process, 
and hindering traditional customs and domestic political processes. 
Additionally, the socioeconomic conditions are said to have inflicted 
great economic pain on already vulnerable segments of the society, and 





The NATO conditions have been overlapping those of the European 
Union in many respects. Their conditions are, amongst others, a 
functioning democracy and a market economy, institutionalised 
democratic civilian control over the military, an accountable defence 
ministry, resolved territorial disputes or conflicts with neighbouring 
countries, bring down state corruption and organized crime, and active 
involvement in the Partnership for Peace program. Two percent of the 
GDP must be spent on defence and the upgrading of military 
equipment, logistics, and weapons systems in order to become 
compatible to NATO-standards. The Partnership for Peace program, 
founded in 1994, was the initiation of the accession processes and 
started out with the cooperation of former Warsaw Pact members. The 
first applicants, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were guided 
through this vehicle for NATO-compatibility before they were formally 
invited as members in 1997, and accepted in 2000. A formally 
preparatory program for prospective members were institutionalized in 
1999, named the Membership Action Plan (MAP). The program 
consists of five distinct chapter covering different areas: political and 
economic institutions, defence and armed forces modernization, 
resource issues, security and intelligence issues, and legal 
standardization. The design is meant to ensure that a country’s domestic 
institutions are made compatible with those of the other members. As a 
part of its second wave of post-Communist expansion, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Slovakia were invited to 
Prague in 2002 to start accession talks.63
As for the direct impact of the conditions for membership, this has for 
example played a stabilizing role on the Hungarian-Romanian disputes 
over borders and minority rights, or helped reducing the excessive 
trafficking of people and restricted materials, weapons, and drugs from 
countries like Romania and Bulgaria. Slovakia might serve as the best 
example of what the conditionality of the EU and NATO has done to
63 Ibid.
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accelerating their transition process. Led by the authoritarian nationalist 
Vladimir Meciar, the small country was left of the first group of post- 
Communist countries invited to EU accession talks. It was also 
excluded from NATO’s first Central European expansion. Both were 
consequences of their lack of progress domestic political reforms. When 
Mikulas Dzurinda and his coalition finally managed to alter the political 
landscape in 1998, they initiated rapid and wide-ranging reforms to 
catch up with the country’s neighbours. The case of the Slovakian 
transition will be further and more detailed discussed below.64
The strict accession criteria advanced by NATO and the EU have 
overlapped to a great and have encouraged the institutionalizing of 
democracies, market economies, and guarantees for individual and 
group liberties. For their part, the advanced reformers o f the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland viewed admission to NATO and the EU 
as complementary processes o f Western integration. Although the 
technical criteria for admittance to these institutions were quite similar, 
very little was made o f the potential differences in the foreign policy 
orientation o f these bodies.65
5.0 The EU’s conditionality
5.1 Pre-1989 developments
Before turning to the actual enlargement policy towards the post- 
Communist states, a brief overview of the EU’s development is in 
order. In 1950, the brainchild of the civil servant Jean Monnet was 
publicised by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, and the 
idea of the European Coal and Steel Community begun to unite the 
European Countries economically and politically, with the main goal of 
securing lasting peace on the continent. The devastating experiences of 
World War II was still in fresh memory and made France, Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg sign the Treaty of
64 Ibid. 34-35
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Paris in 1951. The signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 marked the 
six countries’ formation of the European Economic Community and the 
European Atomic Energy Community. The former was aimed at 
developing a common market for goods and services based on the 
freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and people, while the 
latter was intended to pool the non-military nuclear resources of the 
states.66 The first round of enlargement came in 1973, with the 
accession of Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark. Then Greece joined 
in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. In 1995, the EFTA countries 
Austria, Sweden, and Finland joined, without altering the structure, 
which was originally created for six members.
5.2 The Copenhagen Criteria and after
The political conditions for joining the European Union have 
undoubtedly undergone a major evolution. They have been refined to be 
concerned about special problems relating to post-communist politics, 
but this has again had impact on the pre-2005 enlargement member 
states. At the European Council summit in Lisbon in June 1992, full 
support for the process aiming at consolidating democratic institutions 
in the CEE countries was expressed, thereby guaranteeing the rule of 
law and respect for human rights. This includes the principles 
governing the right of minorities, and the inviolability of borders, which 
can be altered only by peaceful means and through agreement, in 
accordance with the commitments accepted by the signatories to the UN
charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter o f Paris fo r a new
68Europe. The section devoted to the conditions and criteria says that 
three basic conditions have to be in place before applying: European 
identity, democratic status, and respect for human rights.
65 Ibid. 36
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The next decisive step for the accession of the CEE countries to the 
European Union were taken at a summit the European Council held in 
the Danish capital in 1993. The Copenhagen criteria consist of three 
main conditions. First, a candidate country must have achieved stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, 
and respect for and protection of minorities. Second, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union must be in 
place. Third, a country must have the ability to take on the obligations 
of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic, 
and monetary union.69
Another important move came in Essen in December 1994, as the EU 
now not only had acknowledged the possibility of membership for the 
CEE countries, but also initiated on undertaking a plan of action in 
preparation for it. It was taken into account that the EU itself had to 
undergo a process of preparation for the upcoming enlargement. 
Consequently, a meeting plan was set up in this respect, including 
multilateral high level meetings between heads of states and 
governments, foreign ministers, ministers responsible for the internal 
market, in particular in the areas of finance and agriculture, ministers 
for transport, telecommunication, research, environment, justice and 
home affairs, and culture and education. In other words, along the 
whole spectre of policy areas.70
At the Madrid European Council in 1995, some further conditions were 
put forth. The Council underlined the importance of a country to have 
created the conditions for its integration through the adjustment of its 
administrative structures. The European Community legislation must be 
transposed into national legislation, but it was stressed as more 
important that the legislation is implemented effectively through
69 The European Commission:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement process/accession process/criteria/index 
en.htm
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appropriate administrative and judicial structures. This is a 
prerequisite o f the mutual trust required by EU membership71. The 
conditions were further elaborated in the Commission’s Opinion of 
1997, and as of 1998 in the annual regular reports on candidate 
countries. Further, the conditions have been incorporated with several 
EU programmes, like the programmes on financial assistance, the 
accession partnerships, and the pre-accession strategy in whole. There 
have been specifications and additions to the criteria, with the inclusion 
of the fight against corruption as the most notable example. Some 
critics argue that the Commission’s continuous elaborations have been 
unfair, and by doing so they have made far greater demands for the 
political standards of the candidate countries and new Member States 
compared with what the pre-2005 members had to deal with in the 
past.72 Still, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam additionally provided for 
suspension of member states that violates the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
the rule of law, and consequently are the “old” member states now 
formally subject to a democracy test.73
5.3 The EU’s potential for impact
Pridham argues that there are three stages for when the EU has a 
potential for influencing democratization in a candidate country. First is 
the period before the negotiations, when the Copenhagen criteria have 
to be satisfied in order to even considering starting the talks. The 
second stage is when the actual negotiations are conducted, and the 
political conditions as updated are monitored regularly. The final stage 
is once membership begins, and the EU’s direct influence and control 
over the subject begins to weaken. Still, this is the time when the 
indirect effects of the integration are helping the consolidation of
70 Sevic & Wright: 174
71 Ibid.
72 Cooley: 36
73 An example o f this policy is the bilateral sanctions that were imposed on Austria in 
2000 after the controversial policies o f the newly elected Jôrg Haider.
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democracy due to the intensification of networking that goes with 
membership. He argues that this stage is most important for the indirect 
effects, as the deeper effects o f integration o f integration are most likely 
through the embedding o f  new democracies within the EU itself. Still, 
the direct effects are most visible in the two first stages. If a country 
fails to satisfy the political conditions in stage one, as with Slovakia 
under Meciar, the negotiations are blocked. The same can happen in the 
second stage, if the country reverses or violates the fulfilment of the 
political conditions.74
5.4 The limitations
Pridham has also elaborated the limitations of the European Union on 
the conditionality of democratic consolidation. Firstly, there are the 
limitations to the timing of conditionality impacts on the 
democratization. The new democracies in CEE had already established 
their institutions before the methodical and annual application of EU’s 
political condition started in 1997. Hence, the conditionality could not 
be about macro-institutional choice. The second limitation concerns the 
institutional weakness of the European Commission, which was in 
charge of the conditionality and accession business. The objections 
against the Commission are mainly its bureaucratic, instead of political, 
approach. The standard “list system ” it adopted for monitoring the 
political conditions indicated this just as did the Commission’s
7c
avoidance o f any model o f democracy . Thirdly, even though the 
conditionality policy of the late 1990s and after was the most ambitious 
attempt ever seen in the EU’s history or in any international 
organization, some of the limitation can be characterized as self- 
imposed in the Commission’s conditionality agenda. Important gaps 
were the lack of attention to crucial democratic actors such as political
74 Pridham (2002): 958-959
75 Pridham (2006): 381
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parties, which were completely neglected, or the civil society. In 
addition, the Commission has at occasions, discreetly encouraged the 
European Parliament to raise issues it finds difficult to handle publicly. 
The fourth issue of limitation is the Commission’s inter-governmental 
focus, as national governments were chosen as the main agents in 
candidate countries. This set forth several obstacles, as accession 
governments were not always in a position to carry through 
conditionality effectively.77
6.0 Case Studies: Slovakia and Czech Republic
6.1 Introduction to the political structures
In Western Europe, the party system was getting its shape already in the 
late 19th and early 20th century. The basic structure was defined by 
socio-political cleavages translated into partisan alignments around the 
time universal suffrage was introduced. In sharp contrast to this stand 
the Central European countries, which first democratized or re­
democratized in the early 1990s. The socio-political cleavages valid for 
the Western countries cannot simply be transferred to the latter. The 
formation of the party system has been divided into four phases. The 
first on is ranging from the collapse of the communist regimes to the 
first elections, and had one dominant ideological division, namely the 
supporters and opponents of the old regime, communists from anti­
communists. In this period, mass movements were formed and then
n o
transferred into umbrella-parties.
The second phase took place during the first half of the 1990s, and the 
ideological line of the first phase was replaced by a new conflict line 
between those who had success and those who did not after the 
economic transformation from central planning to “free-market”
76 Civil society is narrowly defined as the development o f NGOs, which is covered




economy. As truly free elections were held, the former umbrella parties 
disintegrated, and anti-communist parties formed coalition 
governments, mostly unstable. In addition, several parties with a narrow
7Qpopular base gained representation in parliament.
In the third phase, during the second half of the 1990s, the conflicts of 
the second phase intensified. The second and third80 free elections were 
held, and the political result was that the social-democratic successors 
of the former communist party took over in many places, and the party 
system got more concentrated. In addition, the electorate was highly 
unpredictable. The last phase of this categorization has showed that the 
main conflict lines did not alter. At the next elections, the voters 
punished the social democrats were they failed to deliver, but not 
everywhere. The political camps of the third phase proved to be stable 
and the number of parties in the parliament did not rise again. A 
relatively stable party system seemed to have emerged, organised along 
the recognizable left-right scheme81.
In the three years following the dissolution of the Communist regime in
1989, a majority of the CEE countries embarked on the task to form 
new constitutions that would respond to the new realities the countries 
now faced. For Czechoslovakia, this task was to be one of many 
complications, and eventually lead to the creation of two sovereign 
republics. As will be referred to below as well, the first parliament was 
dominated by a lengthened struggle to define the divisions of powers 
between the federation and the two republics. The alternatives in June
1990 were a common state with large powers vested in central 
government; a common state with large power vested in Czech and 
Slovak governments; a confederation; or two completely independent 
states. Tripartite talks took place between the federal government and 
the governments of the two republics took place between August and
78 Schmitt & Thomassen: 14
80 In Czech Republic and Slovakia, the second free elections were held in 1994.
79 Ibid.
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December in 1990, and resulted in the adoption by the Federal 
Assembly of a constitutional amendment on power sharing. The 
amendment went quite far in meeting Slovak demands, including a 
somewhat absurd provision that the governorship o f the central bank 
would alternate annually between a Czech and a Slovak. Yet it soon 
became clear that it did not go far enough82. The debate started out with 
questions concerning the division of powers between the federal level 
and the national governments. Then, the main dissent was between the 
proposals on a federation and a more loosely structured confederation.
In the end, it was not easy to distinguish the diluted idea of a 
confederation from the creation of two independent states. In 1991, a 
federal bill of rights was adopted, as the attempts to create a new federal 
constitution had not succeeded. Slovakia adopted their constitution on 
September 1, 1992, within which the federal bill of rights was retained. 
The constitution came together in a hurry, and included an unusual 
feature , as the parliament had the power to elect and remove both 
executives, the prime minister and the president.84 According to the 
constitution, Slovakia is a parliamentary system of government in 
which the government is responsible to the parliament. The legislative 
branch is represented by the National Council, which is the sole 
legislative body. It consists of 150 members, elected for a term of four 
years by proportional representation. The office of the president and the 
government represent the executive power. The constitution was 
changed in September 1998 to allow direct popular election of the 
president, who is elected for a term of five years. Mainly ceremonial 
powers are included in the presidency. The government is the supreme 
executive body, and it is appointed by the president on the 
recommendation of the prime minister. The judiciary’s main body is the 
Supreme Court and it is independent of the executive and legislative 
bodies.85
8'Ibid. 15
82 Elster, Offe & Preuss (2000): 71
83 Article 106 o f the Slovak Constitution
84 Ibid. 71 -73
85 Kegler (2003): 321-34
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The process of drafting a Czech Constitution began when it had become 
evident that the Federation would dissolve. The government 
commission, including many of the MP’s and experts who had 
participated in the attempts at drawing the constitution of the federal 
assembly, dominated the process. In order to present alternative 
proposals to the government commission, the Czech Parliament also 
appointed a commission, including representatives of all parliamentary 
parties. Still, the latter’s function was mainly to comment and amend, 
while the former would take the lead of the drafting process. The debate 
centred around issues such as the quorum for passing constitutional 
laws, the scope of the presidential powers, the structure of the 
parliament, the territorial division of the republic and whether or not the 
federal bill of rights passed in 1991 should be included. The past 
seemed more influential86 than, for example constitutional models from  
democracies abroad. However, the importance o f the past -  or at least 
the ghosts o f the past -  cannot be isolated from the immediate political
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context . The political context was marked by two features. First, a 
widening gulf between the government coalition on the right side and 
the opposition on the left side of the centre was making the political 
spectre dominated by two ideological blocks, and second, there were 
legal and political problems stemming from the dissolution of the 
Federation. These elements made constitutional bargaining more 
demanding. The constitution was finally adopted on 16 December 1992, 
as the product of a political deal made under pressing conditions, by a 
vote of 172 to 6 with 10 abstentions. A few words should be given on 
the actual constitutional arrangements agreed upon as well. The Czech 
Constitution established a parliamentary system, in which the 
government is dependent on the support of the majority in the 
parliament. The government can be removed from office by a vote of 
no confidence. The president is meant to enjoy only ceremonial 
functions, and is indirectly elected. The parliament is bicameral,
86 In shaping the constitution
87 Zielonka (2001): 332
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consisting of the Chamber of Deputies with 200 members elected for 
four years, while the Senate has 81 members elected for 6 years. The 
principles of elections to both chambers are anchored in the 
Constitution, with proportional representation for the election of 
Chamber of Deputies, and a majoritarian system for election to the 
Senate. The judiciary is independent and includes the constitutional 
court. The Constitution emphasises a civic rather than national concept
QO
of citizenship. Zielonka argues that the decision of the Czechoslovak 
elites in 1989 to continue working under the communist Constitution 
was paid dearly for, since the first period of decision-making has shown
• OQto be the crucial one for forming consensus on constitution making.
6.2 The Czech Republic
6.2.1 Historical context
The Czech Republic, consisting of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia were 
united under the Bohemian crown in the past, but in 1526, the Czech 
lands became a part of the Habsburg Empire. In 1918, Czechoslovakia 
was created by the Treaty of Versailles out of the ashes of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire. Influenced strongly by the political philosophy of its 
first president, Tomas G. Masaryk, the first republic was an 
industrialized liberal democracy.90 The memory o f the Czechoslovak 
Republic between the wars is a strong one in the contemporary Czech 
Republic. Newly created at the end o f World War I  on the northern rim 
o f the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Czechoslovak Republic was the 
only Eastern European nation to experience a continuous democracy 
until the beginning o f  World War II.91 Governments were selected as a 
result of regularly held elections from a multiparty system, and the 
election system was proportional. A five-party coalition, the Petka, was 
the dominant governing mode within the parliament, and agreements 
were made after negotiations among the party leaders prior to the
88 Ibid. 331 -36
89 Ibid. 336
90 Dryzek & Holmes (2002): 240
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formulation of official cabinet level policy.92 The country had the most 
developed industry and the most fully literate population in the region.93 
However, the industry and commerce were concentrated mainly in the 
Czech parts of the republic. The territory faced several internal 
problems, as land that had never before been under one administration 
were now put together, and it included numerous minorities, with the 
Slovaks, the Sudeten Germans, and the Hungarians being the majorities 
of theses. The situation was further complicated by the Czech efforts to 
consolidate the new state in a unitary rather than a federal structure. In 
addition, there was the active agitation by Nazi Germany, which had the 
aim of incorporating the Sudetenland into the Third Reich. The Munich 
Agreement resulted in the incorporation of the Sudeten Germans and 
the most of the area where they were living into the Third Reich in 
1938, and the remaining parts of the First Republic were invaded by the 
Nazis in 1939.94 The Communist party had enjoyed the legal right to 
participate in the political system throughout the interwar period. After 
1941, they supported the Soviet efforts to fight the Nazi occupation. 
When the first election was held in the post-war period, the 
Communists emerged with winning 38 percent of the votes.95
A period of extensive repression followed the 1948 Communist coup, 
and Czechoslovakia was one of the most Stalinist of the peoples 
democracies. In 1968, the Slovak leader Alexander Dubcek began 
cautious party-led efforts at reform that rapidly emerged as the peaceful 
Prague Spring. However, the happiness of liberalization did not last for 
long, as Soviet tanks; leading groups from some of the Warsaw pact 
countries soon crushed any attempt of reform. Instead the era of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine and normalization begun, marked by two decades of
91 Darwisha & Parrot (1997): 151
92 Ibid.
93 The high level o f literacy was a result o f the introduction o f compulsory schooling 
for children between 6 and 12 in the Czech lands. Linz & Stepan (1996): 317
94 Hollis (1999): 8-14
95 Linz & Stepan (1996): 317
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suppression of independent thought and action either by individuals or 
through groups.96
Before turning to the events of 1989, it is worth having a look at some 
of the systemic inheritances from communist rule. First, one important 
feature of the era was the legal change of the unitary structure of the 
state to a federation in 1968. The central rule hindered the practice of 
federalism; nonetheless, some formal structures were created which 
persisted until the collapse. National Councils were created for both 
republics at the provincial level, and serving as elected assemblies, both 
bodies were revivals of earlier national councils from their independent 
experiences. These are today the sovereign parliaments in their 
respective republics. Second, the decision to alter the composition and 
balance of political forces within the National Assembly was also 
important. The unicameral body became the bicameral Federal 
Assembly, and within one of the two houses, the Republics had equal 
representation and constitutional decision required separate majorities 
among each of the two Republic delegations. These powers were not 
used under single party control, but were of great importance in the 
transition to democracy.97
Even in a brief overview of the communist legacy, some social, 
cultural, and historical differences between the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia should be mentioned as well. Historically, the Czech lands 
were part of the Austrian half and Slovakia of the Hungarian half of the 
Austro-Hungarian empire. During that time, the former became one of 
the most industrial parts of the Empire and the latter remained one of 
most agrarian. The languages were different, but still mutually 
intelligible. Slovakia has been more Catholic than the Czech lands. 
From 1939 to 1945, the country was a quasi-independent puppet state 
under Nazi-Germany. Under Communist rule, Slovakia underwent 
rapid heavy industrialization, which was oriented towards the USSR.
96 Linz & Stepan (1996): 317-318
97 Dawisha & Parrot (1997): 151-152
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The result after 1989 was greater structural vulnerabilities toward the 
transformation to a market economy.98 The great disparity in the 
unemployment rates was a clear indicator of that factor.
6.2.2 The Velvet Revolution
Expectations of change started to rise in 1988 with the perestroika of 
Mikhail Gorbachev. Civil society groups like the Charta 77 played an 
important role in mobilizing the citizens, and with the student 
demonstrations in Prague on 17 November 1989, it became evident that 
something was about to happen. The student march, which was regime- 
approved to commemorate the murder of a student during the Nazi 
invasion, turned into an anti-regime demonstration that was brutally 
beaten by the police. Without getting too much into details, a number of 
peaceful demonstrations and general strikes were carried out in the 
following days. One of the main events, and how it was reacted upon, 
can serve as a general illustration:
Early Tuesday, November 21, after a General Committee meeting, the 
government issued various statements tat they would resist further 
antisocialist actions by all possible means. But that afternoon Havel 
spoke to his first large public demonstration. The ambivalence of the 
police was evident to the demonstrators. “The policemen sighted during 
the demonstration were sporting the national colours on their lapels, a 
sign of solidarity with the demonstrators, and were also seen cheering 
Havel99
Subsequently, three days after, the internal defections started to show at 
the elite level of the regime. An all-day meeting was held of the Central 
Committee, which resulted in the submission of resignation by 
Secretary-General Jakes, his secretariat and his politburo.100 The speed 
of the regime dissolution was rapid. Negotiations between the
98 Linz & Stepan (1996): 326
99 Linz & Stepan (1996): 326
100 Ibid. 100
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communist prime minister and the leaders of the emerging opposition 
movements, Civic Forum in the Czech lands and Public against 
Violence in Slovakia, were initiated, with the objectives of the 
formation of a non-communist interim government, the appointment of 
opposition representatives to seats in the parliament and the resignation 
of President Gustav Husak on December 10, 1989. Only nineteen days 
later, on December 29, 1989, the process was completed with the 
election of Vaclav Havel to the presidency.101
6.2.3 From federation to a unitary republic
With the founding election of June 1990, which witnessed a 
participation of 96 percent of the eligible voters, the interim 
administration ended. Civic Forum and Public against Violence 
triumphed and used their new ruling coalition to prepare legislation that 
would turn the country into a market economy. Already from the early 
days of policy formation, membership in the EU formed the cornerstone 
of the foreign policy programme of the Civic Forum. The idealism o f  
the post-dissident Czech government and its sympathy for the difficult 
domestic position o f Mikhail Gorbachev led it to propose the 
simultaneous dissolution o f the Warsaw Pact and NATO, accompanied 
by the creation o f a collective security system embracing the whole o f  
Europe based on the conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe102. However, after negative Western responses, a more 
pragmatic stance was taken, and membership in NATO became a 
declared goal of the Czechoslovak foreign policy.103
Some obstacles that influenced the way of the ordinary parliamentary 
business should also be mentioned. The process known as lustration; 
the search for StB collaborators in the new political elite was in October
1991 put on a statutory footing and extended to the entire public sector.
101 White, Batt & Lewis (2003): 43
102 Zielonka & Pravda (2001): 329
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Another hinder was the fragmentation along ideological lines within the 
broad political groupings, with the result that in 1992, there were 
eighteen fractions within the federal legislature. In addition, the passing 
of bills was complicated by complex rules guaranteeing Slovak deputies 
the veto in key areas, in order to safeguard them from being outvoted by 
the more numerous Czechs. Finally, there was a general, and justified, 
dissatisfaction from the Slovak side regarding their portion of autonomy 
within the constitution, which will be discussed further below.
Sufficient to mention here is that it can be argued that the velvet divorce 
came as a result of two contemporary main events. First, the 
constitutional debate was mainly so-called politics of symbols, and 
second, due to two charismatic leaders, which emerged from the ashes 
of the Civic Forum and Public against Violence and gained power after 
the 1992 election, Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar respectively.104 
Some remarks should be made about the elections, as several changes 
had taken place. By the time of the elections, the broad cross- 
ideological groupings had turned into political parties. In the Czech part 
of the federation, the result gave Vaclav Klaus and his Civic 
Democratic Party, ODS, most confidence, with 38 percent of the votes 
for the Czech National Council105. They allied with the Christian 
Democratic Party, KDS. Other major parties were the Left Bloc, 
consisting of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, and the 
Democratic left, got 17.5 percent, and the Czechoslovak Social 
Democracy106 gained 8 percent of the votes.107 The plurality winner 
succeeded in forming a four party coalition, consisting of ODS, KDS, 
KDU-CSL and ODA108, which occupied 105 out of 200 seats, and 
remained in office for the entire period. The 1992 election was, in 
effect, two separate elections, one in each o f the republics. The issues 
were different, as were the participants. While the dual regime change 
movement had disappeared in the Czech Republic, in Slovakia, one
104 White, Batt & Lewis(2003): 4 4 ^ 5
105 The future Czech Parliament
106 Later named the Czech Social Democratic Party- CSSD.
107 Kemen (1999): 252
108 Civic Democratic Alliance
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regime change movement was succeeded by another109. Nonetheless, no 
matter of why and how, as of 1 January 1993, Czechoslovakia was 
history and the world witnessed the birth of two independent republics: 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
6.2.4 Towards consolidation
In the period from 1992 to 1997, the Czech Republic was a reliable and 
steady member of the first wave of applicant countries. Expectations 
from the EU went well along with the political and economic agenda of 
the Czech government, and did not influence the regular policy-making 
much. However, in areas such as reform of the state administration, 
protection of minority rights, and support of civil society, the progress 
was not so positive, although this was not noticed much by the EU due 
to its lack of systematic evaluation. In early 1995, the Europe 
Agreement governing trade liberalization between the Czech Republic 
and the EU came into force, even though most of the provisions for it 
were adopted with the earlier interim agreement of 1992. It included 
provisions for a steady liberalization of trade over a ten-year period, 
with some expectations in areas such as agriculture. In accordance with 
its free market ideology, the Czech government wanted an acceleration 
of the schedules in the agreement. They were considered hindered by 
protectionist measures, such as the 1993 ban on the import of livestock, 
meat, and dairy products from Eastern Europe. After the establishment 
of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993, the Czechs were criticised by 
several international actors for the treatment of the Roma minority. In 
1995, the White Paper on integration into the Single Market was put 
forth, which measured the free movement of goods, services, capital, 
and people. In large, as with the Europe Agreements, the requirements 
were corresponding with the government’s free market ideology. The 
formal application for EU membership was submitted in January 1996. 
The role of Prime Minister Klaus should also be given a brief notice in
109 Dawish & Parrot (1997): 327
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this context. He favoured a rapid entrance into the EU, and was at the 
same time criticizing a supranational EU as well as any measures that 
could hinder the free market.110
Criticism o f the EU did not tarnish the Czech Republic’s star status 
o f in the West, in part because the Czech foreign ministry worked 
overtime to smooth over Klaus ’ controversial statements. But it did 
limit the direct influence o f the EU on Czech Politics. By claiming 
to be “West” o f the West Europeans, Klaus ensured that his 
administration, much o f the media, and a good deal ofpublic 
opinion retained a provincial confidence in Czech superiority, 
rather than opening the country to perhaps salutary influences. EU  
membership came to be understood as a reward for an economic 
job  already well done111.
The first half of the 1990 had proven to be relatively stable in terms of 
the political system, obviously, if one disregards the decision to break 
up of the federation. By the time of the 1996 elections, some 
complications occurred, as the parliamentary was doubly complicated 
by the new senate. A new legislative chamber was added to the 
Chamber of Deputies, but with a different election system with 
elections occurring in November following the June elections to the 
Chamber of deputies. The election in June produced a near-stalemate, 
as the Coalition led by the Civic Democrats and Klaus obtained 99 
seats, only two seats in short of absolute majority. The orthodox 
Communist Party overshadowed the more moderate Left Bloc, and two 
small centrist parties disappeared from the Chamber. The Czech Social 
Democrats became the second largest party in the Chamber of Deputies. 
No clear single winner emerged by either party or ideology, but more 
importantly, the party system was simplified by fewer parties entering 
the Chamber of Deputies than before. In addition, while in the previous 
election 19 percent of the votes were cast for small below-threshold
110 Zielonka & Pravda (2001): 330 - 32
111 Ibid. 332
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parties, only 9 percent suffered from the same fate in 1996. The end- 
result was the beginning of a parliamentary term with an unstable 
balance between government and opposition parties. As for the voter 
participation, it was decreasing. The voter turnout had been 85 percent 
in 1992, while it declined to 76 percent in June 1996. It is also worth 
noting that many changes were taken place among the parliamentary 
political parties, mostly among the ones in opposition that resulted in a 
slight increase of the power of the government coalition, the emergence 
of independent members, and a series of splits among the opposition 
parties. The changes paralleled the shifts in the public opinion, showing 
an increased popularity for the Social Democrats, rivalling the Civic 
Democratic Party. In this election period, the European Commission’s 
Opinion on the Czech Republic’s application, examining the political 
and economic reforms in the country was published in July 1997. It 
stressed the shortcomings of the reforms in areas such as enterprise 
restructuring, bank privatization, and public administration. The lack of 
reform in the latter was the single greatest cause for concern, as it was 
necessary in order to be capable to implement the acquis 
communautaire. The judiciary and civil service were also strongly 
criticized. Just as the report was written, and negotiations were about to 
begin, the country experienced economic downturn and political 
instability. Klaus and his government were deposed in November 1997 
by its coalition partners and a faction within the party. In exchange for 
money, party officials of both ODS and ODA had given favours related
• 119to privatization and banking. Due to the fall of the Klaus government, 
an interim centre-right technocratic government was formed by the 
Czech National Bank Director Josef Tosovsky, including independents, 
members of the ODA, the KDU-CSL and the anti-Klaus wing of the 
ODS. It had the support of the Social Democrats in return for promising 
early elections in June 1998. A new right-wing party was formed in 
January 1998, called the Freedom Union, US. It collected its members 
from both ODS and the disintegrating ODA. The government initiated
112 Zielonka & Pravda (2001): 343
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important reform steps in order to regain the trust of the international 
community, and used the NATO and EU requirements as an argument 
for new legislation. Opinion polls in the period showed an increased 
support for EU membership, 61 percent favoured entry in January 1998 
as compared to 58 percent in September 1997.113
From the 1998 election for the Chamber of Deputies, the political scene 
consolidated further. The vast majority of the significant parties had 
retained relatively stable support from the electorate since the mid’ 
1990’s. The result of the election was five political parties securing 
their place in the Parliament, and during the following four years, no 
other parties appeared to be able to emerge above the threshold. The 
Czech Social Democratic Party, led by Milos Zeman won the 
electorates trust this time, and gained 32.3 percent of the votes, 
followed by the Civic Democrats with 27.7 percent, while the 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia won 11 percent. The 
Christian and Democratic Union and the Freedom Union gained 9 and 8 
percent.114 This parliamentary period was going to be unusual, in terms 
of the Czech Republic being a post-communist country, as several 
observers in the West interpreted it as the atypical rise of a Social 
Democratic party without ties to the Communist past. This is however a 
truth with modifications. The other unusual factor was the forming of a 
government based on just one party, as the proportional election system 
tends to create coalitions. In addition, it remained in office the full 
term.115 The reason for the stability in the 1998-2002 term was the so- 
called opposition agreement with ODS, which meant that ODS would 
not bring the government down, and thereby getting some of their 
preferences through as well. CSSD initially wanted a coalition with the 
KDU-CSL and US, but the latter refused the cooperation as they 
claimed they could not betray their right-wing voters. Zeman did in 
other words not have many choices left but to make a deal with the
113 Ibid. 344 -45
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115 Henderson (2003):
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ODS. CSSD faced several problems in this period, as the economy was 
shrinking, the number of unemployed people was increasing, in 
addition to general social problem, which had been ignored or set aside 
due to other priorities. As for the EU-question, the party had been 
strong advocates of membership all the way, and meeting the 
requirements had been a cornerstone in their electorate programme. 
However, due to several factors, such as malfunction in preparing 
relevant legislature, and a lack of political will, there was not a great 
progress in meeting the conditions. Consequently, Czech Republic was 
ranked behind Hungary, Poland, and Estonia in the Commission’s 
Regular Report of October 1999. Criticized was first and foremost the 
slow pace of legislative alignment and economic reform across the 
board. Still, some of the efforts were rewarded as well, in the area of 
bank privatization and judiciary.116 Although the political scene 
remained stable, it had its consequences. The electorate did not approve 
of this way of performing politics, and showed their discontent by not 
attending to the 2002 election.
CSSD won for the second time with 30.2 percent of the votes, while 
ODS gained 24.5. The big surprise in this election was the Communists, 
KSCM, which managed to get 18 percent of the votes, mainly due to 
protest votes from the transition losers, i.e. those who were 
economically worse off after the regime change.117 Further notice was 
given to the fact that the CSSD managed to stay in government. The 
voter turnout was quite low though, only 58 percent of the electorate 
showed up on the day of the election. After negotiations, CSSD formed 
a coalition with the Christian Democrats and the Freedom Union, which 
gave them 101 seats in parliament. CSSD’s leader Vladimir Spidla 
became the new prime minister, while Cyril Svoboda from the Christian
1 1 o
Democrats was chosen as foreign minister.
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According to Kopecek and Sedo, one can divide the Czech parties’ 
attitudes towards EU in the year 2002 into three groups: consistently 
pro-European, pro-European with reservations, and anti-European. The 
first group includes CSSD, which already in 1995 declared EU 
integration to be the main priority in Czech foreign policy. (...) the 
party considers consistent participation o f the country in the European 
structures alongside with the adoption o f norms common in member 
countries to be very advantageous119. The party saw it as important to 
adopt European models in social welfare, and further the benefits in 
other fields, such as the economic arena. The coalition partners, the 
Christian Democrats and the Freedom Union, shared the same positive 
attitude towards EU membership, although they stressed different areas 
as important, such as human rights and the freedom of movement in 
wider space, as well as the larger markets. Alone in the middle, ODS is 
characterized with the positive term pro-European with reservations. A 
more commonly used expression to characterise the party is 
Eurosceptic, or in their own words, Eurorealist. The paradox is that the 
majority of their voters have been supporting the accession. The party 
has not been rejecting membership, just strongly criticized what the EU 
has become, i.e. the social dimension and the deepening of the 
cooperation and the institutions. The positive aspects in their eyes are 
the possibilities of participating and sharing in greater economic space. 
The above-mentioned expression Eurorealist originates in the 
publication Manifesto o f  Czech Eurorealism, which was an outline of 
political alternatives should the Czech Republic not be accepted in the 
European Union. In the third category, the Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia rules alone with the label anti-European. Still, it 
is not a major political issue for the party, and the ODS has more often 
been commented upon by the media with its critical remarks towards 
EU. Their stance has been said to derive more from the opinions of the 
grass-root members and party sympathizers. Consequently, the coalition 
government formed after the 2002 election was, in light of the
119 Kopecek & Sedo (2003): 2
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characterizations made above, consistently a pro-European one. 
However, this does not say that the result of the election can be 
interpreted as a pro-European vote, as no party based their campaign 
solely on the EU-question, other issues dominated in the campaigns.120 
Both parliamentary periods had shown a stabile commitment of the 
governments, as well as the oppositions, in implementing the accession 
criteria and conducting the negotiations. Nothing stood in the way of
191the prospective EU- membership of the Czech Republic.
6.2.5 Back to Europe
During the accession period, the West often honoured the Czech 
Republic as one of the best pupils in the class, as no major hinders got 
in the way of the accession process. Most of the business was running 
smoothly, and the citizens appeared to want the membership. The low 
turnout in the referendum on the EU membership was therefore a 
surprise to some of the Western observers. Only 55.2 percent decided to 
use their vote when the referendum was held 13-14 June 2003. In 
political terms, that year did not start out in the best manner, as the 
Czech Republic had failed to choose a successor to President Vaclav 
Havel. An absolute majority of all members in both chambers was 
required for the candidate, and the Czech politicians were just not 
willing to make a compromise. There were even discussions on altering 
the constitution in order to permit direct elections. Eventually, after 
several votes with two sets of candidates, the controversial former 
Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus managed to win by a single vote, with the 
help from the Communist Party and some members of the CSSD. The 
presidential office in Czech Republic is a ceremonial one, but Klaus 
was soon making political statements that were highly political. He was 
a prime minister when the country submitted its application, but was far 
from encouraging people to vote yes in the upcoming referendum,
120 Ibid.
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while all the other presidents of the accession states promoted 
membership. The referendum was in fact the first one to be held in the 
Czech Republic, and a special constitutional law was passed to permit 
one on the membership question.1221 May 2004, the Czech Republic 
reached the goal that, more or less, had been the main priority of their 
foreign policy for a decade and a half.
6.3. Slovakia
6.3.1 Historical context
Prior to 1990s, Slovakia’s only experience of statehood was as a Nazi 
puppet state during World War II. However, that experience is 
obviously not looked upon as a favourable foundation for creating a 
new state. In order to build a “new” identity, the Slovaks had to look far 
back in their history, to the Great Moravian Empire, in order to find 
previous experiences with statehood. The Slovaks were under 
Hungarian control for centuries, yet they had no separate status or any 
state-forming institutions during the period as some other countries 
were entitled to have. The religious composition of Slovakia was 
mainly Roman-Catholic, but there were also Protestants, Greek 
Catholics, and members of the Orthodox faith living in the territory.
The Slovak language was first codified in 1787, and the whole process 
of codification was complicated by the various dialects. The first 
version was not widely used, so Ludovit Stur made a new and more 
successful attempt in 1843, based on the dialects. With this, language 
became a key aspect of national identity. Ivan Hudec, Culture Minister 
under Meciar’s 1994-1998 government even went as far as stating that 
without Stur’s literary Slovak, the modern Slovak nation would most
17 ?certainly not have arisen .
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Slovakia became a junior partner in Czechoslovakia at the end of 
World War I. Czechoslovakia was the only state in Central and Eastern 
Europe which remained democratic during the interwar period. Still, the 
Czechs were very reluctant to give Slovaks more control over their own 
affairs, as they feared the effect this would have on demands from the 
Sudeten Germans. Another factor was the many Czech citizens working 
as officials in Slovakia. Such aspects were contributing to making 
Slovakia an easier target for manipulation by the national-socialists led 
by Hitler before and during World War II. Insignificant independence 
was experienced, before Slovakia once again was incorporated into 
Czechoslovakia. The experience of being a Nazi puppet state was 
nothing but damaging, among the most severe experiences was the 
deportation of 70,000 Jews to concentration camps. Antifascist partisan 
movements were present during the wartime, and the 1944 Slovak 
National Upspring was fought by both communist and democrats. In the 
1946 election, the Democratic Party won 62 percent of the Slovak vote, 
while the Communists won about 30 percent. In an agreement signed in 
Kosice in 1945, the Czechs and Slovaks were given equal status; 
however, this was not upheld in the aftermath.124
During the communist era, there were some experiences of reform 
movements. Most notably were the liberal and nationalist elements 
during the 1968 Prague Spring.
The pre-1968 Communist regime had been in many respects harder on 
the more traditional and religious Slovaks than on the Czechs, and 
Slovak writers and politicians provided the impetus for many of the 
changes that occurred throughout the 1960s, with the Slovak Alexander 
Dubcek becoming the symbol o f the Prague Spring movement.
Nonetheless, Czechs blamed the Slovaks for being more concerned about 
the federalization of the state than about liberalizing the economy and 
providing for civic freedoms125.
124 Ibid.
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In the period after 1968, known as normalization, the regime in 
Slovakia were relatively more moderate than in the Czech Republic, as 
the Czechs were punished harder than the Slovaks were. Hence, the 
regime was also generally more accepted in Slovakia. During the years 
of normalization, the Slovak national question was a topic only among 
dissidents and émigrés. Nationalism was given a deeply negative 
meaning by Communist propaganda. The opposition activity first 
became visible in the late 1980s, with the so-called nonconformist 
communities, consisting mainly of artists, scientists, environmentalists, 
and Catholic activists who were united only in 1989. The 
Anticommunist ideas were expressed through underground
19 ftpublications.
The first Slovak alternative political organization was Public against 
Violence, VPN, which was an anticommunist umbrella movement 
founded on 20 November 1989; three days after the Communist regime 
started to loose their grip in what later became known as the Velvet 
Revolution. The VPN were crucial in forming the first post-communist 
federal and republic governments, as well as in implementing the initial 
political and economic reforms. The period o f political change in late 
1989 and early 1990 was similar in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 
and prominent slogans included The end of one-party government, 
Return to Europe, Truth and love wins over lies and hatred, Free
1 ryn
elections, and We are not like them . Vladimir Meciar, which will be 
given more attention below, was also a VPN representative, and served 
as Slovak minister of interior and environment in the government that





6.3.2 Towards Slovak independence
In early 1990, the first conflict occurred between the Slovaks and the 
Czech, in connection with the new state name and symbols. The Slovak 
parliament proposed to name the new state the Federation of Czecho­
slovakia, by which they wanted to demonstrate the existence of 
Slovakia as a separate nation. After several disagreements, and 
complaints from the Slovak side, the official state name became the 
Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. In the elections held in June
1990, VPN won 29.3 percent of the vote and emerged as the strongest 
Slovak party. It formed a coalition government with the Christian 
Democratic Movement, KDH, which received 19.2 percent, as well as 
the Democratic Party, DS, which gained 4.4 percent.129 Meciar became 
the first Slovak prime minister. Nationalist sentiments were shown 
when a draft for a constitutional bill was put forth, which declared 
Slovak as the state and official language with no exceptions, which led 
to protests from the significant Hungarian majority. The final version 
allowed ethnic minorities to use their mother tongue in official contexts 
when they represented at least 20 percent of the population.
The language question developed to become the central issue in the 
strife between the Nationalists and the Europeanists. The latter camp, 
consisting mainly of government representatives, argued that tolerance 
towards minorities was an important step if the country whished to be a 
part of Europe again. The Nationalists argued that Europe was not 
going anywhere and that the domestic issues were more important. 
Because of the disputes, the VPN experienced a greater distance to its 
voters, which again turned to eventual disintegration. Another outcome 
was the radicalization of certain pro-national groups in Slovakia, as 
Matica slovenska. Throughout the period of the language debate, the 
debates on the competencies of the republic within the federation, and 
the drafting of a new constitution to replace the communist one, were 
running simultaneously. The Czech public was now not very
128 Ibid.
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sympathetic to Slovak efforts at making themselves more visible in the 
world, and the Czech politicians and media frequently labelled Slovaks 
as nationalists or even fascists130. There was a growing gap in the two 
populations’ tolerance towards each other.
Within the political fractions, the tension was also increasing. In 1991, 
the VPN dissolved, and the parliamentary presidium voted to dismiss 
Meciar from his position as prime minister. The accusations were his 
visit to the Soviet Union and the misuse of Communist-era secret police 
files against his opponents. Jan Camogursky, the founder and leader of 
the KDH, took over the post as prime minister. Another result was the 
establishment of the HZDS131, where about half of the VPN joined 
Meciar. Consequently, the VPN changed its name to the Civic 
Democratic Union. The HZDS’ program was based on the support of
Slovak sovereignty, and the party became increasingly popular with the
111)nationalists.
In the 1992 election, Meciar was the central figure of the party’s 
campaign. His image was influenced by his dismissal as prime minister, 
as well as the allegations that he had been an informer of the KGB and 
StB, which, contrary to what one might expect, strengthened his 
position. The independence issue was at the centre of the political 
discourse, and the parties ranged from those who wanted full 
independence, like the HZDS, to gradual independence coinciding with 
the integration into the European Community, which was favoured by 
the KDH, to a freer federation, proposed by the SDL, as well as the 
ODU view on continuing the current federation. Other topics were the 
economic policy, as unemployment had reached 11.5 percent by the 
second quarter of 1992, while it was only 2.9 percent in the Czech 
Republic. An opinion poll conducted early in 1992 showed that 31.2 
percent of the Slovaks saw this as the most crucial social problem. The
131 The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
132 Ibid. 30-38
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HZDS won the election with 37.3 percent of the votes133, SDL got 14.7 
percent, and KDH came in third with 8.9 percent. The HZDS’ 
popularity was in large based around the notion of having Meciar as a 
strong leader of Slovakia.134
6.3.3 The break-up
As mentioned above, there were negotiations on the form of the 
continuing federation between the Czechs and the Slovaks. However, 
things were complicated by several factors. The election result in 
Slovakia was not the only problem. The Czechs had elected Vaclav 
Klaus as prime minister, and he was a hard-liner who told the Slovaks 
to either accept the existing federation or declare full independence.135
It was widely known that Meciar went into the negotiations with the aim 
of creating a confederation of equal states; however, since Klaus called 
his bluff by rejecting such an arrangement, Meciar was forced to accept 
full independence. Repeated opinion polls showed that a minority o f 
Slovaks and Czechs favoured outright independence for their republic, 
and Czechoslovakia divided without a referendum. Although it was Klaus 
who in the end pushed Slovakia toward independence by refusing to 
accept a looser partnership, Slovakia was frequently seen by the world as 
the instigator o f the split.'36
It was time to face the new realities. The HZDS now found itself in the 
forefront, the party had moved from opposition to position, and 
Slovakia had gained the independence the strong nationalist fractions of 
the party had been aspiring. In addition, the country’s economic 
difficulties were worsening. Still, when it came to making the new 
constitution, the HZDS could not act entirely on its own, as they had to
I i n
rely on both the right wing SNS and the post-communist SDL to gain
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the necessary majority, which was three-fifths of the seats. This made 
the constitution retaining many elements of the Czechoslovak system, 
with a relative weak presidency and a unicameral parliament.
6.3.4 The 1994 and 1998 elections
After the 1992 election and the independence, many changes occurred 
within the HZDS. The party had troubles with making a consistent 
approach in their foreign policy. Meciar’s original intention was a 
“third way” between capitalism and socialism, but he realized that there 
was little chance of success in this position. Several important figures 
left the party, like the first foreign minister, Milan Knazko, as well as 
his successor, Jozef Moravcik. They managed to dismiss Meciar’s 
government in March 1994, but lost to the HZDS again a couple of 
months later in the early elections.. Still, the short-lived government 
had some importance, as it took some of the glory away from Meciar. 
His next move was to make his deputies in the upcoming election to 
sign a pledge promising that they would give up their parliamentary 
seat if they left the party during the electoral term. This move had two 
effects. It did make the parliamentary bloc more uniform, but the 
obvious negative effect was the authoritarian tendencies it showed 
within the party. The 1994 coalition was built together with the SNS
1 IQand ZRS. It quickly embarked on an authoritarian path, as it sought to 
concentrate power in the hands of Meciar and curb the rights of the 
opposition in Parliament, and tried to force President Michal Kovac out 
of power. 140Meciar managed to loose two foreign ministers in his 1994- 
1998 government as well, due to his controversial and often non- 
consistent politics, the latter especially true in regards to the foreign 
policy. The HZDS’s disputable way of conducting politics did not go 
unnoticed by the international community, and the European Union had
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to react. In October 1995, a demarche141 by the EU Troika started a 
continuous stream of criticisms of Meciar and his government, and 
made appeals to them to comply with its obligations as an associate of 
the EU. The demarche reminded Slovakia that it was an associated 
country in a pre-accession period, and that the criteria of the 
Copenhagen Summit were applicable to it. The year after, Slovakia was 
given increasingly concrete signals that its chances of receiving 
membership had diminished sharply. Finally, the decision was made not 
to invite the country to accession negotiations in 1997. However, 
Slovakia was assured that it still was eligible in and welcome in 
principle, but a precondition for it was a change of the government.142 
Of course, the EU was not the only actor in the international community 
that reacted:
The erosion of rights, which first attracted the attention of international 
observers in connection with the vocal and well-organized Hungarian 
minority, spread to all groups in society that did not support the ruling 
coalition. Parliament passed or attempted to pass laws to control the 
media, NGO’s, educational establishments, and culture. Thus in 1997 the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe could conclude 
that “there are some ways in which Slovakia has negatively distinguished 
itself from other post-communist, newly independent states; by a pattern 
of violence against opposition leaders and journalists, by threats to 
parliamentary and constitutional democracy, and by the presence of a 
right-wing extremist party within the ruling coalition ”14i.
Schimmelfenning, Engert and Knobel144 argue that in spite of the EU’s 
warnings, and the high stakes involved, the conditionality of the EU did 
not have no major or lasting impact on the behaviour of the Meciar 
government. He did not share the intense anti-Western orientations of 
some of his coalition partners; still, he was prepared to give in on his 
former pro-integration beliefs in order to remain in power. During
141 A formal diplomatic presentation o f the EU’s official position
142 Ibid. 503
143 Dryzek & Holmes (2002): 176
60
Meciar ’s four-year term in government, Slovakia was a clear-cut 
instance o f failed response to democratic conditionality'45.
In 1998, it was again time for the electorate to evaluate the government 
performance, as the election was coming up in September. The HZDS 
campaign was based on a few themes, such as the protection of the 
nation, and it encouraged people to have confidence and trust the 
party’s vision for the future, in other words rather vague slogans with 
little emphasis on concrete problems. Both HZDS and SNS used similar 
images, such as beautiful and familiar scenery of the countryside, as 
well as national figures and history. The former used slogans such as 
“The country of your heart”, the latter spread their word with slogans 
such as “Our homeland, our nest”. The opposition parties, on the other 
hand, were addressed pressing issues such as social problems, 
democratization, European integration, and privatization, and 
emphasised personal contact with the citizens. However, they were also 
playing on patriotism; an example was the SDK’s leader Dzurinda 
doing a bicycle tour around the country as well as a trip on a steam 
train, all the time with stressing his close contact to the nature and the 
people. Change was another key issue for the opposition parties, and 
themes such as the rule of law and equality, and the call for values such 
as justice, decency, peace, and dignity. As for the economic factor, the 
most crucial issues were wages and prices. All the opposition parties 
were stressing the importance of integration into the EU, while HZDS 
was mostly ignoring the EU in its campaign.146
The result of the election in 1998 came to change the political landscape 
in Slovakia. Although HZDS gained most of the votes once again, it 
was a narrow victory that only gave them one more seat in parliament 
than SDK., 43 to 42. Most importantly, this did not matter much, as the 
party was unable to form a government. The SNS gained 14 seats, while
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the third partner failed to gain any seats at all. The opposition side’s 
four major parties won totally 93 of the seats, which gave them a 
constitutional majority.147 They formed a grand coalition government 
under the leadership of Dzurinda. The failure of the HZDS was their 
rhetoric, although it kept the former voters mobilized, it did not attract 
enough new ones. In addition, voters who had been apathetic in the last 
election were now mobilized by the efforts of the civil society, which 
worked strongly in favour of the opposition. Another important factor 
was the unification of the opposition itself, which also showed an 
improvement in the political atmosphere.148 Schimmelfenning, Engert, 
and Knobel argues, that the EU conditionality might have had an impact 
on the 1998 parliamentary election, as public opinion data suggest that 
there was an awareness and preoccupation in the majority of the Slovak 
citizens about their country’s exclusion from the enlargement process 
and the deterioration of their position in Europe. It is likely that these 
factors helped to mobilize the supporters of the democratic opposition, 
and affected the general mood for change. Still, the foreign policy was 
not the most pressing problem in the electorate’s opinion, and one 
cannot argue that the absence of conditionality would have altered the 
election outcome.149
6.3.5 Hello, Europe?
With the election of Mikulas Dzurinda, and a broad anti-nationalist 
coalition, the international environment turned to Slovakia with 
renewed interest. This was a strengthening factor for the coalition, 
which otherwise could have had troubles with internal fractions. The 
fact that they were working towards the prospect of joining both the EU 
and NATO, was undoubtedly unifying and motivating. Wide-ranging 
changes occurred in the field of culture, as former foreign minister 
Knazko was appointed culture minister. Still, there were critical voices 
claiming that the coalition had gone too far in distancing itself from the
147 The SDK won 42„ the SDL 23, the SMK 15 and finally the SOP 13 seats
148 Fisher (2006): 156-168
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importance of culture for the national identity that had prevailed under 
Meciar. In the 2002 election, Dzurinda was again given confidence by 
the electorate. He formed a government coalition of four centre-right 
parties; his newly established Slovak Democratic and Christian Union, 
SDKU; the SMK; the KDH and the ANO, the New Civic Alliance, a 
liberal party founded in 2001. The parties received 15.1%, 11.2%, 8.3% 
and 8% respectively. Further political changes were the new left- 
leaning party, Smer, which had emerged from the ex-communist SDL.
Only HZDS, SMK and KDH experienced parliamentary continuity. In 
other words, the Slovak political landscape was far from being 
consolidated.150 The HZDS was still the party who gained most votes,
19.5 percent had voted for Meciar and his colleagues. Sill, they did not 
have any chance of forming a government, due to a combination of 
personal ill feelings towards Meciar, and a fear of international 
reactions, as it had been made clear by certain Western voices that 
Slovakia’s accession opportunities would be threatened if Meciar 
became prime minister. The international actors managed through its 
direct and indirect influence to help Slovakia catch up with its 
neighbouring countries, and in 2004, it became accepted as a member 
of both the European Union and NATO.151
Many of the reforms implemented in 1998-2002 were made with a single 
goal in mind: catching up in the race for EU membership with the other 
countries in the Visegrad group, which also included the Czech Republic, 
Poland, and Hungary. Slovakia’s improved international position was 
not only the primary goal, but also the major achievement of Dzurinda’s 
successive governments. In fact, an October 2004 poll showed that 
Slovakia's EU accession was seen as the greatest success o f the second 
Dzurinda government by 60 percent o f the Slovaks, while other perceived
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successes included the fight against organized crime, the strengthening 
of the Slovak currency, and the country’s accession to NATO152.
The importance of EU’s conditionality was evident. Slovakia was 
hoping to get an invitation to start accession talks in December 1998, 
but the country faced rejection due to its lack in fulfilment of 
Copenhagen political criteria. As mentioned above, the criteria required 
that candidate countries have stable institutions which are guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection 
of minorities. This showed the Dzurinda government that it had to work 
hard and sincerely in order to reach its goals. Half a year later, it had 
taken the necessary steps, including the approval of a law on the use of 
minority language, the restoration of parliamentary control functions of 
the opposition, and the holding of presidential elections. Subsequently, 
at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, Slovakia was invited to start 
accession talks, and the formal negotiations begun two months later. As 
for the positive efforts taken by Slovakia to show its good intentions, it 
is worth mentioning a few. The first Dzurinda cabinet raised its 
credibility with the inclusion of the Party of Hungarian Coalition, SMK, 
joined the government coalition.153 On the demand of SMK, and the 
approval of the parliament, the first Hungarian-language university was 
established. Regarding the judiciary, several changes were made, for 
example the establishing of an independent judicial council to oversee 
nomination and dismissal procedures. The economic sector was in need 
of major reforms as well. Slovakia had to step up the enterprise 
restructuring, in particular in the banking sector, as part of the OECD 
required efforts. Three of the country’s major banks were sold to 
foreign investors, thereby allegedly bringing more stability and greater 
competition into the sector. The European Commission acknowledged 
in 2001 that Slovakia had a functioning market economy. Of course, 
there were drawbacks as well. The country faced major fiscal 
challenges in relation to the slow development in reforming the
152 Ibid. 186
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pension, health care and social welfare system. The unemployment 
rates were still high. Corruption was a major problem in both public and 
private sector, as well as within the government.154
Further reforms were initiated after Slovakia received its invitation to 
join the EU. Large fiscal reforms were carried out on the justification of 
bringing the public finance deficit in line with the Maastricht criteria for 
entry into the Euro zone, and they were made possible due to the 
homogeneity of the government after the 2002 election. A radical shift 
was made in the taxation policy, with the introduction of a 19 percent 
flat tax, and a harmonization rate of VAT at 19 percent. This gave the 
country one of the highest indirect tax burdens in the EU, and had 
negative impact on lower- and middle income categories. The goal was 
to catch up with West European income levels as well, and the special 
emphasis on attracting foreign direct investment was seen as one of the 
most important means of achieving that.155
7.0 The end of the EU-journey
On 1 May 2004, the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined the European 
Union together with eight other countries. It was the biggest 
enlargement in EU’s history. The former communist countries had 
undergone rapid and radical transformations, both in economic and 
political terms. In only 15 years time, they had gone from being 
communist regimes into reaching the EU’s conditions for being 
classified as consolidated democracies. Still, it was too early to say the 
political systems were completely consolidated, as several of the new 





The very first month after accession, elections were held to the 
European Parliament. The low turnout was perceived with 
disappointment by many observers, and several explanations were put 
forth to explain the low interest in the election. Some would argue that 
the citizens of the new member states had limited knowledge about EU 
institutions and the function of the European Parliament. A 
contradictory argument was that the EU had been given a high profile in 
the CEE states, there had been accession referendums, and the 
accession date had been celebrated throughout Europe. Critics would 
emphasise the subordinate role of the countries in the accession period, 
and claim that the election result also had to be viewed in the light of 
the widespread annoyance at the continuing restrictions on the free 
movement of labour. The campaigns by the political parties were 
mostly focusing on domestic questions and a general promise to 
promote their country’s national interest in Brussels. In addition, the 
electorates had undergone a decade and a half of elections that had great 
significance on both the political and economic development. The status 
of political parties and politicians was in general not very high, and 
disillusionment with politics was widespread. Further, due to the small 
size of most of the CEE countries, the number of MEP’s elected was 
also marginal, often constituting around 1 percent of the total number of 
732 MEPs. Czech Republic had a voter turnout of 28.3 percent, while 
Slovakia set a new record by achieving the all-time low EP election 
turnout of 17 percent. The year before, Slovakia received a record high 
93.7 percent yes-vote in the referendum on EU membership. Both from 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, a majority of the MEPs joined the right- 
of-centre European People’s Party-European Democrats (EPP-ED). 
Three MEPs from Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
aspired membership, but was rejected due to the party’s past. ODS and 
Vaclav Klaus were allowed to express their hostility towards the EU in 
the smaller European Democrats part of the group, together with the 
British Conservatives and Unionists. Nonetheless, even though there 
was much talk about a growing euroscepticism, the voting in the EP- 
election was interpreted as protest votes against the incumbent
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governments, rather than to express the electorate’s views on the EU. 
This was particularly evident in the case of the Czech government, The 
CSSD, which had gained a 30 percent vote in the 2002 parliamentary 
election, was only getting 9 percent in the EP election, and 
consequently two of the 24 Czech EP seats. The prime minister at the 
time, Vladimir Spidla, gave the poor election result as one of the main 
reasons for his subsequent resignation.156
At the end of the journey, it can also be useful to summarize some of 
the lessons of the general enlargement, which led to the accession of ten 
new members of the EU family in 2004, with eight of them being fresh 
democracies with communist pasts. Pridham argues that the EU’s 
influence on the accession states has been extensive in a wide sense, 
and his main conclusions serve as a good example for the cases studied 
above. The pressure to satisfy the political conditions for membership 
has been relentless, hence the push and pull factor has had a great 
impact on democratic conditionality. The dynamics have provided 
significant scope for the conditionality policy, but the limitations have 
also been visible, in particular by its timing: democratic conditionality 
is not co-terminous in its timescale with democratic consolidation157. 
Further, the policy has in large been top-down, and limited in its effects. 
This is shown by the greater impact on the institutional level, rather 
than the intermediary and societal levels, as well as the greater success 
in formal terms such as institutional and legislative than in concrete 
terms, such as the actual implementation. As for the role of the 
Commission, it has mainly been bureaucratic, but high policy can 
dominate when the member states intervene over conditionality matters. 
Important is also the unqualified commitment of accession governments 
to Euro-Atlantic integration on the conditionality’s chances. Through 
this element, their action on conditionality matters becomes strategic 
and rather instrumental for the sake of achieving entry. Nevertheless, 
domestic factors may play an influential part in the implementation o f
156 Henderson (2005): 163 - 68
157 Pridham (2006): 397
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conditionality ranging from state capacity to party-political consensus 
on integration, together with social compliance and adaptation, 
although with much variation according to the particular political 
conditions as well as the country in question . Pridham’s last point are 
the various negative aspects to the pursuit of conditionality, meaning 
for example possible effects on democratic procedures from EU 
bureaucratization, and complications from the mistrustful state of elite 
or mass relations in post-communist societies and some elite resentment 
in CEE towards apparent double standards over political conditions. 
Still, if the popularity of membership is high, such factors do not need 
to be damaging during the process of accession. Improvements for 
future enlargement are summarized as follows:
I f  there are any lessons fo r  improvement in conditionality policy in 
the future, these would have to include: on the EU side, a less 
rigidly top-down approach, one with more decided cooperation 
with “bottom-up ” actors like NG O’s as well as one that is less 
mechanically bureaucratic and fragmented in its conception and 
more sensitive to national particularities in its application; on the 
CEE side, more realism and less obsession with the accession 
deadlines, thus allowing for a more considered implementation o f  
the political conditions. It is, however, recognized that these 
suggestions run into basic problems o f working methods on the one 
hand and o f political expectations on the other159.
8.0 Conclusion
The countries of Central Europe serve as interesting cases for scholars 
of many sciences. There are a number of subjects suitable for analyzes 
and comparisons, both within each country as well as in examining the 




incorporated into the academic structure of many universities. Theories 
have been developed in the fields of economics, comparative politics, 
political theory, sociology, and anthropology, to mention a few. Here, 
the writing has been aimed at keeping the focus on the transition 
towards democracy in Czech Republic and Slovakia. The EU as an 
external actor has been used as a variable for examining how its 
conditionality has affected the democratic consolidation within each 
case. In order to show the development, the elections have been 
evaluated, as it is the governments, i.e. the political elites, who have 
played the most important role in deciding on which policies to pursuit 
at the domestic level. Additionally, the general historical development 
have been applied as a natural driving force for the analysis.
Even in their years of coexistence in Czechoslovakia, several 
divergences could be identified. One factor offered to explain their 
varieties is by looking at their different historical paths. The Czech 
Republic was part of the Austrian half, and the Slovaks of the 
Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This led to more 
development in terms of industrialization and literacy in the Czech 
parts. Further, one can emphasise differences such as language and 
religion. After the regime change, it seems like the choices of political 
elites have played a rather important role in the development of 
Slovakia. The EU has without doubt influenced the democratic reforms 
after Meciar lost power. The negative remarks and disapproval from the 
international society during the Meciar period influenced both the 
political elites as well as the public. To which extent is however 
difficult to measure, as one cannot argue that the prospect of 
membership was the most important factor in the 1998 election. Still, it 
is certain that EU membership would not have happened without the 
end of Meciar’s era in government. The Czech Republic is not such a 
clear case study for the impact of the EU’s conditions, as there has been 
a consensus among the political elites, as well as in a majority of the 
electorate all along. Of course, some periods have shown greater signs 
of instability, such as around 1997, and the persistency of the negative
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statements from high profiled politicians, such as the country’s current 
President Vaclav Klaus, might have seemed disturbing at times. Still, 
by looking at the larger picture, the Czechs accession to the European 
Union was never really threatened. The Czech Republic and Slovakia 
have now celebrated their third birthday in the EU family, without 
getting involved in any major quarrels.160
160 The Czechs, led by President Klaus, have tried to show muscles with their 
unwillingness to accept a future constitution o f the EU. How far they are willing to 
take their opposition remains to be seen.
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